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Abstract. Service Level Agreements are a key issue in Service Oriented
Computing. SLA contracts specify client requirements and service guar-
antees, with emphasis on Quality of Service (cost, performance, avail-
ability, etc.). We overview a simple model of contracts for QoS and SLAs
that combines two basic programming paradigms: name-passing calculi
and concurrent constraint programming. In the resulting calculus, called
cc-pi calculus, SLA requirements are constraints that can be generated
either by a single party or by the synchronisation of two agents. We rely
on a system of named constraints that equip classical constraints with a
suitable algebraic structure providing a richer mechanism of constraint
combination. Besides small examples, cc-pi has been applied to a Telco
case study. The model allows to specify, negotiate, and enforce policies
in complex scenarios where policy negotiations and validations can be
arbitrarily nested.
1 Introduction
A key feature of the service oriented computing paradigm is the possibility of se-
lecting and invoking services. Beside functional properties, services may expose
non-functional properties including Quality of Service (QoS), cost, and security.
Non-functional parameters play an important role in service discovery and bind-
ing. Indeed, a service requester might have minimal QoS requirements below
which a service is not considered useful. Moreover, multiple services that meet
the functional requirements of a requester can still be diﬀerentiated according
to their non-functional properties. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) capture the
mutual responsibilities of service provider and service requester with respect to
non-functional properties, with emphasis on QoS values.
The terms and conditions appearing in a SLA contract can be negotiated
among the contracting parties prior to service execution. In the simplest case,
one of the two parties exposes a contract template that the other party can ﬁll
in with values in a given range. However, in general the two parties may need
a real negotiation in which they pose arbitrary complex policies, namely SLA

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2requirements and guarantees. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, they may
weaken their policies. Moreover, during the service execution, the service usage
is checked for compliance with the SLA deﬁned at subscription time.
The cc-pi calculus [6, 7] is a model of contracts with QoS and SLAs that is also
suited to study mechanisms for resource allocation. This model is inspired by two
basic programming paradigms: name-passing calculi and concurrent constraint
programming (cc programming) [11]. While the informal concept of constraint
is widely used in a variety of diﬀerent ﬁelds, a very general, formal notion of con-
straint system has been introduced in the cc programming paradigm. Basically,
cc programming is a simple and powerful computing model based on a shared
store of constraints that provides partial information about possible values that
variables can take. Concurrent agents can act on this store by performing either
a tell action (for adding a constraint, if the resulting store is consistent) or
an ask action (for checking if a constraint is entailed by the store). As compu-
tation proceeds, more and more information are accumulated, thus the store is
monotonically reﬁned.
The cc-pi calculus enriches classical cc programming with a channel-based
communication mechanism and a restriction operation a` la pi-calculus [10] along
with a possibly non-monotonic evolution of the constraint store. Speciﬁcally, cc-
pi features a symmetric, synchronous mechanism of interaction between senders
and receivers, where the sent name is ‘fused’ (i.e. identiﬁed) to the received
name, and such an explicit fusion allows using interchangeably the two names.
The entities involved in a SLA negotiation are modelled as communicating cc-pi
processes and SLA guarantees and requirements are expressed as constraints that
can be generated either by a single process or as a result of the synchronisation
of two processes. Moreover, the restriction operator of the cc-pi calculus can
limit the scope of names thus allowing for local stores of constraints, which may
become global after a synchronisation.
The constraint systems adopted in cc-pi rely on named c-semirings. A
c-semiring [2] is a commutative semiring with top element and such that the
sum operation ⊕ is idempotent. Intuitively, the preference level associated to
each variable instantiation is modelled as a value of the c-semiring; the combi-
nation of constraints is expressed by the c-semiring product⊗, while the semiring
sum a⊕ b chooses the worst constraint better than a and b. Named c-semirings
enrich classical c-semirings with a notion of support to express the relevant names
of a constraint. Semiring-based structures can specify networks of constraints for
deﬁning constraint satisfaction problems and model fuzzy or probabilistic values,
as well as Herbrand uniﬁcations.
A recent trend in Telecommunication is to adopt service-oriented technolo-
gies to expose capabilities (e.g. call control, sending/receiving messages, or ac-
cess information on end users), implemented in a Telco network, to applications
deployed in third party administrative domains. In such a context, network op-
erators and third parties have to deﬁne SLAs in order to monitor the access and
usage of Telco capabilities. We have applied the cc-pi calculus for specifying,
negotiating, and enforcing contracts for Telco services.
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3Related work. Bistarelli and Santini [4] have presented a constraint-based model
for SLAs as an extension of soft cc programming [3]. The proposed model in-
cludes operations quite diﬀerent from those of the cc-pi calculus, such as those for
relaxing the constraints involving a given set of variables and then adding a new
constraint, and for checking if a constraint is not entailed by the store. Coppo
and Dezani-Ciancaglini [8] have proposed a calculus of contracts by combining
the basic primitives of the cc-pi calculus with the notion of sessions and session
types to design communicaion protocols which assure safe and reliable commu-
nication sequences. Bacciu et al. [1] have developed a formalism for specifying
the service guarantees and requester requirements on QoS and the negotiation
mechanism. Unlike our model, their approach relies on fuzzy sets rather than on
c-semirings. SLAng [12] and WSLA [9] are XML-based languages for deﬁning
SLAs at a lower level of abstractions. The elements of SLAng are also constraints
on the behaviour of associated services and service clients, but their are speci-
ﬁed in OCL. WSLA provides the ability to create new SLAs as functions over
existing metrics. This is useful to formalise requirements that are expressed in
terms of multiple QoS parameters. The semantics for expressions over metrics is
not formally deﬁned, though.
2 The CC-Pi Calculus
In this section we outline the main features of the cc-pi calculus. The interested
reader can refer to [6] for a detailed presentation of the calculus.
The cc-pi calculus combines synchronous channel-based communication with
primitives like tell and ask that are inspired by the constraint-based computing
paradigms and that account for placing constraints and making logical checks.
In more detail, a single cc-pi process tell c.Q can place a constraint c (which
corresponds to a certain requirement/guarantee) if c is consistent with the actual
store and then evolve to process Q. The process check c.Q behaves like tell c.Q
except for the fact that c is not added. Similarly, the process ask c.Q checks
whether c is entailed by the actual store of constraints and, in the positive
case, becomes Q. Alternatively, two processes P = p〈x˜〉.P ′ and Q = p y˜.Q′ that
are running in parallel (P |Q) can synchronise with each other on the port p
by performing the output action p〈x˜〉 and the input action p y˜, respectively,
where x˜ and y˜ stand for sequences of names. Such a synchronisation creates a
constraint induced by the identiﬁcation of the communicated parameters x˜ and
y˜, if the store of constraints obtained by adding this new constraint is consistent,
otherwise the system has to wait that a process removes some constraint (action
retract c). Finally, a process (x)P declares a local name x that can become
public as a result of a synchronisation.
Underlying constraint system. The cc-pi calculus is parametric with respect to
named constraints, which are meant to model diﬀerent SLA domains. Conse-
quently, it is not necessary to develop ad hoc primitives for each diﬀerent kind
of SLA to be modelled. A named constraint c is an element of a named c-
semiring, namely a c-semiring structure and equipped with a notion of support
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4supp(c) that speciﬁes the set of “relevant” names of c, i.e. the names that are
aﬀected by c. The notation c(x, y) indicates that supp(c) = {x, y}. Formally, a
c-semiring S = 〈A,⊕,⊗, 0, 1〉 is a commutative semiring with top element and
such that ⊕ is idempotent. C-semiring values express a preference level, while
the combination of constraints is expressed by the product operation and the
sum of two constraints a and b chooses the worst constraint better than a and b.
The relation  over constraints is deﬁned as a b if a⊕ b = b. Intuitively, a b
expresses that a is more constrained than b, or, more interestingly, that a entails
b. A set C of named constraints is consistent if the product of the elements of C
is diﬀerent for the bottom element 0.
Soft constraints. Named constraints are particularly suited to specify soft con-
straint satisfaction problems. The key idea underlying constraint satisfaction
problems is to solve a problem by stating constraints representing requirements
about the problem and, then, ﬁnding solutions satisfying all the constraints.
Soft constraint satisfaction problems are meant to express preferences rather
than strict requirements or to provide a not-so-bad solution when the problem
is overconstrained. Formally, given a domain D of interpretation for a set of
names N and a c-semiring S = 〈A,⊕,⊗, 0, 1〉, a soft constraint c can be repre-
sented as a function c = (N → D) → A associating to each variable assignment
η = N → D (i.e. instantiation of the variables occurring in it) a value in A, which
can be interpreted e.g. as a set of preference values or costs. Soft constraints can
be combined by means of the operators of S. For instance, the interpretation of
the constraint c = x ≤ a ⊗ b ≤ y, where x, y are names in N , a, b are domain
values in D, the underlying c-semiring is S = 〈{False,True},∨,∧,False,True〉,
and ≤ has the usual meaning of “less than or equal” on numbers, is that c is the
function (N → D) → {False,True}, with the assignment η such that cη = True
if η(x) ≤ a and b ≤ η(y), while cη = False otherwise.
3 A Telecommunication case study
In this section we analyse a case study borrowed from the Telecommunication
area. We show how to apply the cc-pi calculus for specifying, negotiating, and
enforcing policies for Telco services. We start by introducing a service scenario
called CallBySms.
The CallBySms service allows a mobile phone user to activate a voice call by
sending an SMS message to a speciﬁc service number. The SMS message must
contain a nickname of the person the user wishes to call. The service is able to
automatically ﬁnd the number associated with the nickname and to set up a third
party call between the user and the callee. In order to keep privacy, the service
does not know actual phone numbers, but only opaque-id representing users.
The service in turn uses two services, ThirdPartyCall and ShortMessaging, for
specifying the operations respectively necessary to set-up and control calls and to
receive/send short messages. Figure 1 depicts a possible service scenario in which
John wishes to call Mary and he knows that Mary’s nickname is “sunshine”.
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51. The Third Party application subscribes the services that are used by the
CallBySms service and signs a SLA contract with the Network Operator;
2. The CallBySMS service is activated and the Third Party application receives
a service number, e.g. 11111;
3. Mary sends an SMS “REGISTER sunshine” to the service number 11111;
4. The service associates “sunshine” to the opaque-id of Mary;
5. John sends an SMS “CALL sunshine” to the service number 11111;
6. The service retrieves the opaque-id associated to “sunshine” and set-up a
call;
7. John’s phone rings; John answers and gets the ringing tone;
8. Mary’s phone rings; Mary answers;
9. John and Mary are connected.
Fig. 1. CallBySms Service Scenario
Policies as constraints. We now focus on specifying and ensuring time policies.
In [5] we address modelling and enforcement of other policies such as policies on
frequency. For simplicity, hereafter we take the reference constraint system to be
a classical constraint satisfaction problem by considering the named c-semiring
of Boolean values. However, such constraint system can be easily generalised to
soft constraint satisfaction problems by replacing the underlying c-semiring with
an arbitrary c-semiring.
The constraint ctime(i, f) = (7 ≤ i ≤ 9) ⊗ (15 ≤ f ≤ 18) speciﬁes the initial
and ﬁnal time ranges within which calls can be set up by end users. Similarly,
dtime(i, f) = (6 ≤ i ≤ 8) ⊗ (17 ≤ f ≤ 19) states the time requirements of
the third party. The result of combining these policies is the intersection of
5
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etime(i, f) = ctime(i, f) ⊗ dtime(i, f) = (7 ≤ i ≤ 8) ⊗ (17 ≤ f ≤ 18). Note that
the constraint etime is part of the SLA contract among the network operator and
the third party application and it is validated by the operator domain once a
call request from a end user is received. Other policies might depend on some
network operator parameter while being related to the agreement of the third
party with every end-user.
Cc-pi speciﬁcation. We now show the main steps of the formalisation in cc-pi
calculus of the policy negotiation and service execution scenario of CallBySms.
We refer to [5] for a complete description of the speciﬁcation.
The negotation phase between the third party application and the network
operator consists of the two parties placing their own constraints and trying to
synchronise on port x in order to export their local parameters. If the set of all
such constraints induced by the synchronisation is consistent, the two parties
have concluded a contract, which is expressed by the c-semiring product of all
constraints:
NO Neg(x, z, t) = (i, f) (tell ctime(i, f)). x〈i, f〉.NO Acpt Reqst(x, z, i, f, t)
3rdPA Neg(x) = (i′, f ′) (tell dtime(i
′
, f
′)).x〈i′, f ′〉. 3rdPA Acpt Reqst(x )
The process ClockT is meant to simulate the actual time by increasing of a time
unit a variable t starting from its present value T. We assume this + operation
automatically resets the clock by the end of the day:
ClockT(t) = retract (t = T). tell (t = T + 1).ClockT+1(t)
After a service activation request by the third party application, the network
operator is ready to accept registration requests from end-users and to forward
them to the third party application. An end-user intending to register to Call-
BySms tries to synchronise with the network operator on z with its private
identity mary and nickname sunshine as parameters. The network operator for-
wards this request to the third party application by sending on x the nickname
and a private channel name ch, though not revealing the user’s identity:
Regist User(z, sunshine) = (mary) (z〈mary , sunshine〉.Wait Calls(mary))
NO Acpt Reqst(x, z, i, f, t) = (id ,nn)(z〈id ,nn〉.x〈nn〉.(
NO Acpt Reqst(x, z, i, f, t)
|NO Acpt Call(i, f, t, id ,nn)))
3rdPA Acpt Reqst(x ) = (nn ′) (x〈nn ′〉.(3rdPA Acpt Reqst(x ))
A user who wants to call Mary but only knows her nickname is speciﬁed by
a process sending its private name john on the public port sunshine and then
waiting to be connected with sunshine on port john. The network operator ver-
iﬁes that the call request is within the legal time range. In case of success, the
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connect the two users:
Wait Calls(mary) = (cal ′) (mary〈cal ′〉.cal ′〈〉.Wait Calls(mary))
Caller(sunshine) = (john)sunshine〈john〉.john〈〉.0
NO Acpt Call(i, f, t, id ,nn) = (cal) (check (i ≤ t ≤ f).nn〈cal〉.id〈cal〉.
NO Acpt Call(i, f, t, id ,nn))
The whole system S is given by the parallel composition of the two users, the
clock and the processes specifying the policy negotiation followed by the pro-
cesses modelling the service execution:
S = (x, z, t, sunshine)Regist User(z, sunshine) |Caller(sunshine) |
tell (t = 0).Clock0(t)) |NO Neg(x, z, t) | 3rdPA Neg(x)
Note that our framework can be employed to model more complex negotiation
scenarios, e.g. in which there is an arbitrary number of end-users or in which
the third party application and the network operator may want to retract their
initial policies and replace them with weaker constraints, in order to reach an
agreement.
4 Conclusions
We have presented the cc-pi calculus, a constraint-based model of SLA contracts,
and we have shown its ﬂexibility by analysing a Telco case study. In [7], the cc-pi
calculus has been equipped with an abstract semantics in the style of open pi-
calculus, along with a symbolic transition system with contextual labels. We have
also studied the expressiveness of the calculus: we have provided a reduction-
preserving translation of cc programming [6] and a translation of the explicit
fusion calculus by Gardner and Wischik which respects open bisimilarity [7].
We plan to further explore expressiveness issues by translating other calculi
like the open pi-calculus and the applied pi-calculus and by proving that such
translations preserve the behavioural equivalences deﬁned for these calculi.
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Abstract. This paper describes the main features of the Web Services Translation tool, WST
for short, a tool for modeling and veriﬁcation of Web Services systems with time restrictions.
The diﬀerent parts of WST are then presented, and a case study is used to show the potential of
this tool. This case study is called “Dynamic Internet Purchase Site” and it allows us to see the
capabilities of modelling, code generation and veriﬁcation of the tool. This case study is a Web
Service system with time restrictions, which are one of the main objetives of the WST veriﬁcation
part.
1 Introduction
Internet and Web technologies are a new way of doing business, more cheaply and eﬃciently, as enter-
prises can provide new and dynamic services in a faster way by the composition of Web Services. But
B2B e-commerce is still emerging, and new software technologies are being required to support their
development. Speciﬁcally, there is a need for eﬀective and eﬃcient means to abstract, compose, analyse,
and evolve Web Services in an appropriate time-frame [8].
In this framework we can ﬁnd some problems, which are the main motivation of the development of
Web Services Translation tool:
– The interest in web services has grown in recent times as more and more intra/inter-organizational
applications use this model, but little eﬀort has been dedicated to systematically design and analyze
web services systems.
– The analysis of Web Services Coordination and speciﬁcally, the timed restrictions that must be
enforced in Web Services for which timed aspects are crucial for a correct functionality. This point
can be covered by using the so called choreographies, which describe the composition of several
existing Web Services in order to provide a Composite Web Service.
– The use of formal techniques bring rigour and consistency to system speciﬁcation and implemen-
tation. Web services systems can also be described, analysed and implemented by using formal
techniques. They allow us to have unambiguous Web services descriptions, which can be later
checked for detecting errors or can be used to prove that some properties of interest hold.
Thus, the main goal of this work is to present a tool based on a model-driven methodology, which
allows us to deal with these problems. WST tool covers diﬀerent methodological phases for the design
and implementation of Composite Web Services, following the software life cycle: design and imple-
mentation of choreographies with timed restrictions, and their validation and veriﬁcation. In the design
phase we use the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML 2.0 [13]), in order to model the system conforming
to the initial analysis requirements in a proper way. Thus, WST supports the modelling phase by means
of a UML sequence diagram editor.
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The paper is structured as follows. A discussion of related work is shown in Section 2. In Section 3
the Web Services Translation tool is presented. Section 4 explains the application of WST tool. Finally,
the conclusions and the future work are presented in Section 5.
2 Related Work
In the market we can ﬁnd diﬀerent Web Services tools. For instance, H. Foster et al. [5] show the
design and implementation of a tool, called WS-Engineer, for a model-based approach to verifying
compositions of web service implementations. The tool supports veriﬁcation of properties created from
design speciﬁcations and implementation models to conﬁrm expected results from the viewpoints of
both the designer and implementer.
In [6] Xiang Fu et al. present a tool, called WSAT, for analyzing and verifying composite web service
speciﬁcations by using model checking techniques. In this case the speciﬁcations are written in WS-
BPEL, and they are translated to Guarded Finite State Automata (GFSA), and the model checker
SPIN [10] is then used to analyze and verify the system.
Another tool for the analysis of Web services systems is EA4B [7], which deﬁnes an execution
log for WS-BPEL. The execution log can then be read for post-execution debugging or for near real-
time monitoring. This tool can be integrated with static analysis tools such as WSAT, so error traces
generated by WSAT can be translated to log ﬁles and visually displayed.
There is another tool, called WS-VERIFY [9], intended for the analysis of WS-BPEL speciﬁcations
by using the NuSMV model checker [3]. The speciﬁcations written in WS-BPEL are translated into a
formalism called WSTTS (Web Services Timed State Transition Systems), which are similar to timed
automata.
In [1] a declarative service ﬂow language (DecSerFlow ) is also presented, which is used for monitoring
purposes. In that work process mining techniques are used to check the conformance of service ﬂows
by comparing the speciﬁcation written in DecSerFlow with reality. A tool supporting this language
(Declare ) is presented in [12].
3 Web Service Translation tool
Web Services Translation tool (WST) is an integrated environment for the modelling and veriﬁcation
of real-time systems. It allows us to model systems by using UML 2.0 sequence diagrams, then we can
translate these diagrams into WS-CDL speciﬁcation documents and, in turn, the WS-CDL speciﬁcations
are translated into Timed Automata, which are then used to simulate and verify the system behaviour.
This tool is available at http://www.dsi.uclm.es/retics/WST/.
In the generation of Web Services, as in the generation of any software system it is necessary to
apply a methodology covering every phase of the life cycle. Figure 1 depicts a diagram that shows a
schematic view of the top-down methodology implemented by WST, which consists of the following
phases:
1. Analysis phase: In the analysis phase we use a technology based on goal models performing require-
ment engineering, KAOS [11] in order to capture the requirements that the system must fulﬁll.
2. Design phase: In the design phase we use the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML 2.0 [13]), and
speciﬁcally sequence diagrams including some of their new capabilities, as the possibility of nesting
frames to model the time restrictions of a system as well as the UML Proﬁle for Schedulability,
Performance, and Time (RT-UML [14]) in order to capture the time analysis requirements of systems
in a proper way.
3. Choreography Implementation phase: we automatically translate the UML sequence diagrams into
WS-CDL documents. The WS-CDL speciﬁcation consist of the diﬀerent parties plus its relationships
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Message −→ Relationship Type & Channel+ & Interaction
Label and Time Constraint −→ Time Variable & Information Type & Expression
Frame “alt” −→ Choice
Frame “opt” −→ Workunit (without repeat condition)
Frame “loop” −→ Workunit (with a repeat condition)
Frame “par” −→ Parallel
Where the symbols +, | are BNF notation, and & is used to join information
Table 1. UML 2.0 to WS-CDL Mapping rules
4. Veriﬁcation of Choreography Implementation phase: the generated WS-CDL documents are trans-
lated into Timed Automata, which are used to simulate and verify some properties of interest by
using the UPPAAL tool. The properties to check are those that we have established in the ﬁrst
step. If we detect some failures here, we return to the second step.
WST applies several XSL Stylesheets to an initial XML document to obtain another XML document.
Let us now describe brieﬂy the two main translations supported by the WST tool.
3.1 Obtaining WS-CDL documents from UML 2.0 sequence diagrams
WST translates a Web Service description with timed restrictions written by using UML sequence
diagrams into a more commonly used language for Web Services choreographies description, WS-CDL.
The WST tool uses three XSL Stylesheets in cascade in order to obtain the WS-CDL document from
the XMI UML document. The UML ﬁle is structured in diﬀerent sections, from which we obtain the
elements that compose the WS-CDL document. Table 1 contains a scheme illustrating how the main
elements of UML are translated into WS-CDL (for more details see [2]).
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3.2 Obtaining Timed Automata from WS-CDL speciﬁcations
WST also translates the WS-CDL speciﬁcations into formal descriptions (Timed Automata) supported
by the UPPAAL tool. In order to obtain these formal descriptions, WST uses XSL Stylesheets in cascade
that are applied over the WS-CDL speciﬁcations. These speciﬁcations contain diﬀerent elements like
role types, channels, variables, control structures, etc, which are translated into the diﬀerent elements
of Timed Automata: templates, channels, variables, states, transitions, guards, and so on. A complete
description of this translation can be found in [4].
4 Case Study: Dynamic Internet Purchase Site
Internet sites have been used to provide several functionalities. Among them, the most typical are
searchers, personal pages (blogspots), information pages, government pages and pages for selling prod-
ucts. This last kind of sites has generated a great expectancy over ﬁnancial markets due to the chance
that represents to cover diﬀerent national markets by using the Internet. This idea has been one of
the most important reason to achieve what we call nowadays the “globalization” phenomenon. This
is the reason to choose selling sites as a case study. This scenario is based on typical selling sites as
“Amazon.com”. The main features that we can discover in these sites are product search, cart, payment
gateway, checkout and carrier facilities. Furthermore, we have modiﬁed it with a new feature that makes
our site dynamic. With this feature, we can modify our site easily by adding or removing new parties
to it. This site accepts three kind of parties, each of them playing a diﬀerent role: provider, gateway or
carrier.
Fig. 2. Relational Diagram for a Selling Site.
Providers supply the site with the products to be sold and the information about them: price, selling
price, description, number of days to be supplied, expiry date, etc.
Web Service Parameters Output Description
Attach Type and Info ID It allows to attach a new party by using the type (Provider, Payment
Gateway or Carrier) and the info parameters. As a result this service
returns the identiﬁcation.
Detach Type and ID none It detaches the party passed as an argument.
Status none Info It shows the state of the selling site: Online, Oﬀ-line or Maintenance.
Info Type and ID Info It returns as a result the info of a certain party identiﬁed by the parame-
ters.
Request PI() none List It elaborates a list of the products and returns it.
AddItem ID and Amount none It adds a product to the user cart.
RemoveItem ID and Amount none It removes a product from the user cart.
PaymentAck PayID none For informing the selling site if a payment has been successfully.
Delivered ID none The carrier informs that the product identiﬁed by the identiﬁcation has
been delivered.
Table 2. Selling Site Web Services
Gateways let user introduce the personal and conﬁdential information in order to perform the
payment.
Carriers transport the product to users within the time bound established with the Internet site. To
accomplish this task, the Internet site requests the time of delivery before asking the carrier to deliver
the product. If the carrier fails to deliver the product in this interval, then the site cancels the delivery
and orders the refund to the user.
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Web Service Parameters Output Description
ProductsInfo none List It returns a list with the products provided by the provider.
Request Id and Amount none It evaluates the request and establishes whether the request can be im-
mediately fulﬁlled or not. In case of a negative response, it returns the
number of days to provide the request.
Booking ID and Amount boolean This service ask for selling a certain product and amount. If an error
occurs, then a negative number is produced.
Status none Info It shows the state of the provider: Online, Oﬀ-line or Maintenance.
Table 3. Providers Web Services
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among the diﬀerent roles and parties. The Internet site runs as
a central system where all actions must be coordinated to achieve the common goal. The user provides
inputs to this system and gets outputs as a result. The Internet site contacts providers for products,
payment gateways for checkout process and carriers for oﬀering users the carriers facilities. Tables 2, 3,
4 and 5 summarize the diﬀerent services oﬀered by each party.
Web Service Parameters Output Description
Request UsrInf and Total PayID It contacts with the bank and accesses to the user identiﬁcation with
the conﬁdential information of the user. If the purchase is permitted by
the bank, then the transaction is performed and a payment identiﬁcation
returned.
Status none Info It shows the state of the payment gateway: Online, Oﬀ-line or Mainte-
nance.
Table 4. Payment Gateway Web Services
Web Service Parameters Output Description
Request UsrInf and ProdInf Days It returns the number of days to deliver the product. If the address is not
reachable by the carrier a negative number is produced.
Delivering UsrInf and ProdInf DelvID It is a delivering order that produces a Delivering Id.
Delivering Stt DelvID DelvInfo It returns the location of the package.
Status none Info It shows the state of the carrier site: Online, Oﬀ-line or Maintenance.
Table 5. Carrier Web Services
A sequence diagram has been elaborated that models the choreographies that could be generated.
In this sense, Figure 3 depicts a scenario where a user performs a typical purchase in the selling site.
The user starts by requesting the product list, then he selects a product and adds it to his cart. Once
the cart has at least one product, the user can remove the product from the cart, adds a new product or
performs the checkout. If this ﬁnal option is performed, then the scenario starts the payment procedure
by contacting the payment gateway with the total amount and the seller information. Then, the user
supplies the credential to the payment gateway and an acknowledgement is sent to the selling site. If the
payment has ﬁnished successfully, then a carrier is requested for delivering the product within 48 hours.
Within this period, once the carrier has delivered the package, he informs to the selling site about it
and the process ﬁnishes. But, if the period has expired, then the seller refunds the money to the user
and informs the carrier to abort the delivery. Other two possible cases captured by this scenario are:
ﬁrst, the possibility of a negative acknowledgment from the payment gateway, in this case the purchase
is aborted; second, the user remains idle too much time and the session expires.
The translation of this scenario into WS-CDL and Timed Automata is depicted in Figure 4. In
the left-hand side of the ﬁgure, we can observe that the XMI deﬁnition of the sequence diagram is
transformed into a WS-CDL speciﬁcation. And in the right-hand side of the ﬁgure, the generated
speciﬁcation is subsequently translated into a timed automata speciﬁcation supported by the UPPAAL
tool.
An example of a simulation of this scenario is shown in Figure 5. This ﬁgure shows a snapshot of
the Uppaal tool at the simulation tab where the scenario is running and several messages are being
sent and received between the user and the selling site at that moment. At the left upper side of this
ﬁgure we can see the automata running in parallel. These automata correspond to three of the parties
involved in the scenario (InternetSite, User, and Carrier).
Another snapshot is shown in Figure 6, where we can see the veriﬁcation process for diﬀerent
requirements that the scenario must fulﬁl in order to prove whether its functionality is correct or not.
In this sense, this ﬁgure shows at the top part the formulas that are being veriﬁed and the results can
be found at the bottom. For example, with this tool we can verify if the scenario can ﬁnish at correct or
incorrect situations. These situations are represented in the ﬁgure by the three ﬁrst formulas; the ﬁrst
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Fig. 3. A piece of the sequence diagram for the study case.
Fig. 4. Translation from XMI sequence diagram into WS-CDL and from WS-CDL into Timed Automata,
respectively.
corresponds to the successfuﬂ delivery, the second to the session expiration and the third to the time
exceeded for the delivery. The second and the third situation should be taken into account despite of
being unsuccessfull scenarios.
We can see that during the veriﬁcation we sometimes obtain negative responses to our requirements.
This cases should be studied in detail by following the next three steps. The ﬁrst step is to generate
the counterexample. The second step consists of following the counterexample in order to detect where,
when and how the error occurs. And last, the third step consists of deciding if it is a real error or an
error occurring due to an inconsistency in the design of the checked requirement. In the case of a real
error, it is necessary to modify the diagram and recheck the requirement to verify if the error has been
ﬁxed. For instance, in the scenario under study, we have found several errors and this errors allow the
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Fig. 5. Uppaal Simulation for the scenario and Uppaal Veriﬁcation process for the scenario.
developers to detect the model inconsistencies in an early phase of the development, decreasing the
number of errors in later phases.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have presented WST as a tool to support Web Services designs with time restrictions.
The starting point in WST are UML 2.0 sequence diagrams, which allow us to model the communication
among the parties, and also the control structures of the communication processes and the variables that
capture the time and control conditions. After modelling the sequence diagrams, they can be translated
into Web Services descriptions. These descriptions are a global view of the communication processes.
Finally, the descriptions will be translated into a formal speciﬁcation supported by a model checking
engine. This engine allow developers to validate the design of the Web Services.
To show these features, we have used a real example based on an Internet selling site where we
have designed a scenario. In this scenario, a user adds several products to a cart, performs the payment
and waits the delivery of the product. We have introduced two time restrictions. the ﬁrst based on the
expiration of an Internet session and the second based on the maximum delay of the delivery.
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Fig. 6. Uppaal Veriﬁcation process for the scenario.
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The modality of saying is central to access control logics. In this paper, we investigate the interaction of
saying with the deontic modalities of obligation and permission. The motivation is to provide a uniﬁed formalism
for phenomena that have been studied separately in the literature – (a) representation in access control, e.g.,
delegation and speaking for, (b) positive and negative permissions, and (c) conformance in the presence of
iterated deontic modalities, e.g., “required to forbid”. The central idea is to use statements that permit or require
other statements. We propose two axiom schemas that transfer permissions and obligations from one set of laws
to another. Policies are expressed in a non-monotonic formalism that accommodates reasoning about the transfer
of permissions.
1 Introduction
Access control is an important problem in trust management systems. Informally, a trust management system in-
volves a set of actors or principals, and a set of controlled or regulated actions, e.g., accessing medical information,
or downloading a song. The goal of such a system is to administrate requests to perform actions. Trust manage-
ment systems are commonly decomposed into two (interacting) components [1]: (a) authentication - determining
the source of a request, and (b) access control - determining whether a request is permitted according to a policy.
We focus on the problem of access control, which involves representing policies and evaluating requests. How-
ever, we will consider policies containing both obligations and permissions, rather than the usual access control
setting where permission is the more important deontic modality.
The motivation for this work is to provide a uniﬁed formalism for phenomena that have been considered sep-
arately in the literature – (a) representation in access control [3, 1, 2, 6, 11, 13], e.g., delegation and speaking for,
(b) positive and negative permissions (cf. [5]), and (c) conformance in the presence of iterated deontic modali-
ties [16], e.g., “required to forbid”. The central idea of this paper is that these phenomena involve the interaction
between the modalities of saying and permission. We discuss each item in turn to illustrate the connection.
Representation in Access Control: While there are a wide variety of access control logics, one commonality
that stands out is a notion of saying [1]. We can express the fact that a principal makes a statement. says
l(A)ϕ
denotes that principal A says ϕ in the set of laws l(A).1 B represents A on ϕ is expressed as says
l(B)ϕ ⇒
says
l(A)ϕ, where⇒ is the implication connective of the underlying logic. Speaking for is a case of representation
where one principal represents another on all statements. In [1], B speaks for A is expressed using second-order
quantiﬁcation, i.e., ∀ϕ : says
l(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ. While there are a few alternatives in formalizing speaking
for [1, 3, 10], we will recast it in terms of the interaction between saying and permission. An advantage of this
analysis is that we can relate problems in access control policies to problems with regulatory texts in general.
We derive speaking for by taking a different view on representation. Speciﬁcally, we add an axiom schema to
a propositional modal logic, which allows us to express speaking for using a propositional formula. The axiom
∗This research was supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907 NSF CCF-0429948 and ARO W911NF-05-1-0158.
1We relativize speaking to a set of laws rather than a principal, i.e., says
l(A)
ϕ, rather than says
A
ϕ. This lets us use saying to reason
about speciﬁc statements [9], and avoid the algebra over principals in [3, 10].
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that we propose involves the interaction between saying and permission. We say that B represents A on ϕ iff A
says that B is permitted to say ϕ, i.e., says
l(A)(PB(saysl(B)ϕ)), where PBψ is read as B is permitted to bring
about ψ. Our the axiom of transfer states that if A says that B is permitted to say ϕ, and B says ϕ, then A says ϕ,
which we express in our logic as
(says
l(A)(PB(saysl(B)ϕ)) ∧ saysl(B)ϕ) ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ
The axiom of transfer is intended for a particular sense of speaking/saying, i.e., speaking on someone’s behalf.
This sense of saying is the usual one in access control. To simplify matters, we do not explicitly represent the
principal on behalf of whom a statement is being made. B speaks for A is expressed as says
l(A)(PB(saysl(B)⊥)),
i.e., A says that B is permitted to say anything (⊥). We motivate our approach by showing how we can express
constructs that have been examined in the literature on deontic logic.
Positive and Negative Permission: The intuitive deﬁnition of permission as the dual of obligation, i.e., PAϕ =
¬OA¬ϕ (OAϕ is read as “A is obligated to bring about ϕ”) is known to be inadequate (cf. [5]). It works ﬁne
for explicitly given permissions. However, for implicit permissions further distinctions need to be made. The
most common distinction is between positive and negative permission. Can we conclude that and action foo not
mentioned in the law is permitted? In one sense (positive permission), the answer is “no”, because no explicit
permission has been given. In another sense (negative permission), the answer is “yes”, because the principal has
not been explicitly forbidden from performing foo.
In our approach, the two kinds of permission are distinguished by varying the scope of negation. To establish
positive permission, we determine whether ϕ ⇒ says
l(H)(¬OA¬foo) provable?, while for negative permission,
we would establish that ϕ⇒ says
l(H)(OA¬foo) not provable? In Section 2, we use the formalism of [9] to reason
about provability and its negation. The negation of provability is needed to express didn’t say. In other words, H
didn’t say ϕ iff says
l(H)ϕ is not provable from H’s statements. The discussion in [5, 15] suggests to us that the
relationship between negative permission and didn’t say is known, but to our knowledge, an explicit representation
of saying has not been carried out in a deontic logic.
Iterated Deontic Modalities: Marcus [16] pointed out a problem in formalizing iterated deontic modalities. We
relate it to the distinction between the two senses of permission. Consider the following statement: A should not
allow her child (B) to play near the road. Which sense of permission is appropriate here? Using positive permis-
sion, we get “A should not explicitly permit B to play”, which is inadequate. Negative permission is appropriate
here – “A should not not require B not to play”, i.e., “A should require B not to play”. To accommodate such
reasoning, the two kinds of permission need to be distinguished in the syntax of the logic. We note that [16]
argues for a distinction between senses of obligation rather than permission. In our approach, the various senses
are distinguished by varying the scope of negation.
We now discuss the relationship between representation and iterated permissions. Suppose a hospital (H)
permits a patient (A) to permit her mother (B) to access her information. We will rephrase the permission as fol-
lows: H says that A is permitted to say that B is permitted to access her information. Formally, this is represented
as says
l(H)(PA(saysl(A)(PBaccess))). If A does indeed permit access to her mother (saysl(A)(PBaccess)), we
will conclude says
l(H)(PBaccess) using the axiom of transfer, i.e., H permits access to B. As a result, iterated
permissions are related to representation, i.e., “H permits A to permitB to do ϕ” iff “A represents H in permitting
B to do ϕ”.
Outline: In Section 2.1, we present the axiomatization of the modal operators for saying and obligation. We
introduce two additional axioms that describe the interaction between the two modalities. In Section 2.2, we
integrate the axiomatization into a logic programming approach of [9], to describe the process of saying. Then,
in Section 3, we discuss our formalism in the context of related work. We consider two examples from existing
access control logics and their representation in our formalism. We also consider the treatment of iterated deontic
modalities [16] and argue that the partial solution provided in this paper is sufﬁcient for access control applications.
2 A Logic for Access Control
In this section, we develop an access control logic, in the form of two interacting components – (a) the inference
component, which involves the choice of appropriate axioms, and (b) the saying component, which is used to
represent policies. Figure 1 shows the interaction between the components of the access control system. There
are two kinds of actions of interest – (1) operational acts, e.g., downloading a song, and (2) speech acts. The
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operational acts are described using a state, which contains the interpretation of predicates, and the speech acts
are described using laws.
Laws:





Law 1 says p





Figure 1: Interaction between the components of the access control system
A principal speaks by introducing laws. In Figure 1, the principals A and B introduce the laws 1 and 2
respectively. The laws are evaluated using the axioms to produce a set of utterances, i.e., what the laws say. To
determine what a principal says, we look at what her laws say, e.g., B says p iff “Law 2 says p” is provable
from the utterances using the axioms. A set of laws can be thought of as a logic program, and utterances as the
extensions that result from the program (via a ﬁxed point computation). Once we have the utterances, there are
several decision problems of interest. The access control problem is to decide whether a request is permitted
by the set of utterances. The conformance problem is to decide whether operational and speech acts satisfy the
obligations imposed by the utterances, and if they do not, violations are reported.
2.1 The Inference Component – Syntax and Axioms
In this section, we develop a predicate logic with two modalities saying and obligation. We allow formulas with
free variables, but no quantiﬁer over objects. The quantiﬁcation over objects is carried out in the process of
saying (Section 2.2), which uses provability in the propositional subset of the language deﬁned here. We begin by
deﬁning the syntax:
Deﬁnition 1 (Syntax) Given sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of predicate names), countable sets of variablesX , object namesO,
boolean variablesB, a ﬁnite set of identiﬁers ID, and a function l : O → 2Id, the languageL(Φ1, ...,Φn, X,O,B, l, ID),
abbreviated as L, is deﬁned as follows:
ϕ ::= p(y1, . . . ,yj) | b | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | saysId ψ | saysl(y) ψ
ψ ::= ϕ | ψ ∧ ψ | ¬ψ | Oyϕ
where, p ∈ Φj , (y1, ..., yj) ∈ (X ∪O)
j , y ∈ X ∪O, and b ∈ B. We assume that X ∩O = ∅. The set of formulas
obtained from each BNF rule are referred to as Lϕ and Lψ respectively, and L = Lϕ ∪ Lψ .
Disjunction ϕ∨ψ = ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ) and implication ϕ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ∨ψ are derived connectives. Oyϕ is read as
“ϕ is obligated of y”. Permission is deﬁned as the dual of obligation, i.e., Pyϕ = ¬Oy¬ϕ. The saying operators
are understood as follows. Principals speak by introducing identiﬁed laws (Section 2.2), thus says
Id
ϕ is read as
“ϕ is said in the laws Id”. l(A) is the set of laws introduced by the principal A ∈ O, allowing us to express “A
says ϕ”.
Note that the BNF rules ensure the alternation of obligation and saying modalities, e.g., Oy saysl(y)Ozϕ ∈
L, but OyOzϕ ∈ L. Following von Wright [19], we understand obligations as applying to actions and their
consequences. The language Lϕ (obtained from the ﬁrst BNF rule) describes actions – (a) atomic actions, (b)
combinations of actions (using connectives), or (c) saying, which is (a consequence of) a speech act. An obligation
is an opinion, which is created via a speech act, but is not an act by itself.
The statements in L will be used in the inference component of access control, i.e., to determine what has been
said. In other words, we will be given a set of utterances U and a question ψ, and we need to determine whether
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U ⇒ ψ is provable. We focus on provability for the propositional subset of L, i.e., without variables and function
applications. The propositional subset of L has the modalities says
Id
ϕ (for all Id ⊆ ID), and OA(ϕ) (for all
A ∈ O).
A1 All substitution instances of propositional tautologies.





′ ϕ (for all Id ⊆ Id′)
A4 OAϕ⇒ PAϕ (for all A ∈ O)
A5 (says
IdA
(PB saysIdB ϕ) ∧ saysIdB ϕ) ⇒ saysIdA ϕ (for all {A,B} ⊆ O, IdA ⊆ l(A), and IdB ⊆ l(B))
A6 says
IdA
(PB saysIdA ϕ) ⇒ saysIdA ϕ (for all {A,B} ⊆ O, and IdA ⊆ l(A))
R1 From  ϕ⇒ ψ and  ϕ, infer  ψ
R2 From  ϕ, infer  Q(ϕ) (for all modalities Q)
Figure 2: Axiomatization of the propositional fragment of L.
We adopt the axiomatization in Figure 2. A1 and R1 give us propositional reasoning. A2 and R2 are common
to both saying and obligation. A3 and A4 are speciﬁc to saying and obligation respectively. Finally, A5 and A6
describe the interaction between the two modalities. We will now discuss the axioms in the context of related
work.
Axioms for Saying: The axioms A1 and A2, together with the rules R1 and R2, gives us the modal logic K. The
K axiomatization was used by Abadi et al [3] as a basis for all (classical) access control logics. Further motivation
comes from our previous work [9]. In [9] and in Section 2.2 here, to describe policies, we evaluate says
Id
ϕ
using provability. Given a set of formulas U , says
Id




ϕ is provable. The K
axiomatization is sound w.r.t. this deﬁnition. A3 says that if ϕ is said by the statements (Id), then ϕ also holds
according to a larger set of statements (Id′). This axiom is also sound w.r.t. [9].
Obligation and Its Interaction with Saying: The K axiomatization, together with A4, gives us the the modal
logic KD. This axiomatization is common to many systems, giving it the name Standard Deontic Logic (c.f. [12]).
The main focus of this work is on the problem of iterated deontic modalities [16]. Our goal is to provide a
partial solution, as needed for access control. We characterize the interaction between saying and obligation with
two axioms. The transfer axiom, A5, is read as “If A says that B is permitted to say ϕ, and B says ϕ, then A says
ϕ”. As we discussed in Section 1, A5 is needed to accommodate speaking for and delegation, and we will discuss
examples in Section 3.1. The self-respecting axiom, A6, is read as “If A permits B to say ϕ using A’s laws, then A
says ϕ”. A6 ensures that statements in l(B) do not (inadvertently) interfere with the consequences of statements
in l(A).
Provability: The process of saying (Section 2.2) relies on provability in the language L. We say that ϕ is provable
(denoted  ϕ), if ϕ is an instance of the axioms A1-A6 or follows from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2.
In the full paper, we establish the decidability of the provability question; that is, given ϕ ∈ L which is
propositional,  ϕ is decidable. There, we provide a Kripke semantics for which the axiomatization is sound and
complete. As in [10], semantics is used to show that a statement is not provable. The full paper also provides the
discussion of the computational complexity of testing satisﬁability of ϕ.
2.2 The Saying Component - Policies and Conformance
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the representation and evaluation of policies or regulations. The result of
evaluating regulation is a set of annotations or utterances, from which we can determine conformance. The
formalism developed here is an extension of [9], and is a generalized form of logic programming. Logic programs
are popular in representing regulatory texts [18, 17, 12], and access control policies [13, 7, 4].
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Deﬁnition 2 (Syntax of Regulation) Given a ﬁnite set of identiﬁers ID, a body of regulation Reg is a set of
statements such that for each id ∈ ID, there exist ϕ ∈ Lϕ and ψ ∈ Lψ such that: id : ϕ ψ ∈ Reg
id : ϕ  ψ is read as: “the precondition ϕ leads to the postcondition ψ”. The distinction between precondi-
tions and postconditions corresponds to the distinction between input and output in input-output logic [14].
Example: We will describe the evaluation using an example from [9], which is a fragment of the law that regulates
collection and testing of blood donations.
(1) Except as speciﬁed in (2), every donation of blood or blood component must be tested for evidence of
infection due to Hepatitis B.
(2) You are not required to test donations of source plasma for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
Statement (1) conveys an obligation to test donations of blood or blood component for Hepatitis B, and (2)
conveys a permission not to test speciﬁc types of donations. We represent the two statements above as follows:
• 1 : bb(u) ∧ d(x) ∧ ¬ says
{2}(¬Outest(x)) Outest(x), and
• 2 : bb(v) ∧ d(y) ∧ sp(y) ¬Ovtest(y)
The predicates are understood as follows. bb(u) is true iff u is a bloodbank, d(x) is true iff x is a donation, sp(y)
is true iff y consists of source plasma, and test(x) is true iff x is tested for Hepatitis B. In the obligation, the
subformula says
{2}(¬Outest(x)) is understood as “u is not obligated to test x according to statement (2)”.
Objects Predicates Utterances
o, o1, bb(o), d(o1), sp(o1), test(o1) says{2}(¬Ootest(o1))
o2 bb(o), d(o2), ¬sp(o2), ¬test(o2) says{1}(Ootest(o2))
Table 1: A state and its utterances
Regulatory statements are evaluated with respect to states, which supply valuations of predicates used in the
statements, and assignments of objects to variables. If the precondition of a statement is true, the postcondition,
with variables substituted by their respective object assignments, is uttered. Table 1 shows a state of a bloodbank
augmented with utterances. There are three objects – o is a bloodbank, o1 is a donation of source plasma, and o2
is a non-source plasma donation. We deﬁne conformance as the satisfaction of all obligations that are derived as
utterances. Thus the state does not conform to the regulation, since o2 is not tested.
Evaluating the regulation: We say that a statement id depends on a statement id′ if says
Id
ψ with id′ ∈ Id
is used in the precondition of id. If dependencies are acyclic, evaluation is performed in the dependency order;
in the case of cycles, a least ﬁxed point is computed. To evaluate the example, we ﬁrst consider permission
2 : bb(v) ∧ d(y) ∧ sp(y)  ¬Ovtest(y). Since the precondition of statement (2) is true for the assignment of
v to o and y to o1, we have the utterance says{2}(¬Ootest(o1)). However, since o2 is not a donation of source
plasma, there is no corresponding utterance. Now consider the formula says
{2}(¬Outest(x)) in the antecedent




{2}(¬Outest(x)). In Table 1, there is an annotation that makes this implication a propositional tautology
when u is assigned to o and x to o1. This lets us, in turn, to produce the utterance says{1}(Ootest(o2)).
3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how various constructs from the literature are expressed in our framework. In Sec-
tion 3.1, we discuss access control examples. Section 3.2 discusses conformance in the presence of iterated




We discuss two access control examples in this section. The ﬁrst example highlights an important restriction of
the policies in Section 2.2, i.e., a policy lets us conclude what has been said, but not what actually happens. The
second example illustrates how the delegation operator of [13] can be deﬁned in our framework.
Example 1 [10]: Consider a ﬁle-access scenario with an administrating principal (A), a user (B), a ﬁle (ﬁle1), and
the following policy:
1. If A says that ﬁle1 should be deleted, then this must be the case.
2. A trusts B to decided whether ﬁle1 should be deleted.
3. B wants to delete ﬁle1.
We introduce a new principal F for the ﬁle system. The set U of utterances (U ) obtained at the ﬁxed point
is {says
l(F ) PA saysl(A)OF (delﬁle1), saysl(A) PB saysl(B)OF (delﬁle1), saysl(B)OF (delﬁle1)}. In the ﬁrst
utterance, the ﬁle system F says that A is permitted to require it (F ) to delete ﬁle1. The second utterance is
the delegation from A to B, and the third utterance is B’s wish to delete ﬁle1. Using A5, we will conclude that
U  says
l(F )OF (delﬁle1). In other words, the system requires itself to delete ﬁle1.
Our analysis differs in an important way from [10]. We do not conclude that ﬁle1 is actually deleted, i.e.,
U  deleteﬁle1. In fact, we can show that there is no policy (as deﬁned in Section 2.2) that lets us make this
conclusion. In some cases, it may be warranted to assume/axiomatize self-conformance, i.e., (says
l(F )OF (ϕ)) ⇒
ϕ. However, conﬂicting self-imposed requirements would make U inconsistent.
Example 2: The delegation operator of [13] has a compelling deﬁnition in our framework. The syntax (in [13])
for delegation is “x delegates (ϕ)d to y”, where d is the depth of delegation. We deﬁne the schema ps(ϕ, x, d),
where x is used to generate variable names, and d ∈ N :
• ps(ϕ, x, 1) = Px1 saysl(x1) ϕ
• ps(ϕ, x, d) = Pxd saysl(xd)(ϕ ∧ ps(ϕ, x, d− 1)), for d > 1
The statement “A delegates (delﬁle1)2 to B” is interpreted as follows: A says delﬁle1 if B says it or anyone that
B trusts says it. Suppose, in addition, that B delegates (delﬁle1)1 to C, and C says delﬁle1. We express this with
the following rules:
1. (x2 = B) ps(delﬁle1, x, 2)
2. (y1 = C) ps(delﬁle1, y, 1)
3.  delﬁle1
If 1 ∈ l(A), 2 ∈ l(B) and 3 ∈ l(C), we will derive A says delﬁle1. Further redelegations by C (by modifying
statement 3) will not be attributed to A.
In [13], a representation statement is used to allow transfers without consuming delegation depth. If C rep-
resents B on delﬁle1, then C is permitted the same redelegation as B. In our approach, delegation is just a
special kind of representation. A delegates (ϕ)d to B iff B represents A on “delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”. If C
represents B on “delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”, then she represents A as well.
Our approach can capture more complicated cases of delegation. For example, A may not wish to trust C
to the same extent as B. Informally, we can express this lack of trust by permitting B to delegate, if she does
not delegate to a higher depth. Such conditional delegations cannot be expressed in the formalism in [13]. Note
however that the restrictions in [13] are motivated from the perspective of efﬁciency, while the focus here is on
expressive power. Exploring restrictions on rules (for efﬁciency) is an interesting problem for further research.
3.2 Iterated Deontic Modalities
The main purpose for our extension of the logic in [9] is to provide a (partial) analysis of iterated deontic modali-
ties [16], i.e., sentences of the form “required to allow x”.
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Example 1 (based on [16]): consider
(3) The owners of parking lots ought to forbid parking near the entrance.
We analyze this sentence as follows: “The owners of parking lots ought to (introduce laws that) forbid parking
near the entrance.”. In other words, (3) is an obligation to introduce a prohibition. If the owner introduces such a
law, then the person parking is viewed as non-conformant, but it is the owner that needs to conform to (3). We can
represent (3) in logic as follows:
3 : owner(x) ∧ person(y) Ox saysl(x)Oy¬pne(y, x)
Here owner(x) denotes the owner of a parking lot, person(y) is a person parking a car, and pne(y, x) denotes
y parking near the entrance of the lot owned by x.
Let us assume a state where {owner(A), person(B), pne(B,A)} hold. Suppose ﬁrst that A does not intro-
duce any laws, i.e., l(A) = ∅. The computed utterances are {says
{3}OA says∅OB¬pne(B,A)}. Here, A does
not conform to {3}, because there is an obligation that l(A) does not satisfy; however, B conforms. Now suppose
that A introduces the law 2 : person(y)  Oy¬pne(y,A). l(A) = {2}. The computed utterances now are:
{says
{3}OA says{2}OB¬pne(B,A), says{2}OB¬pne(B,A)}. Here A conforms to {3}. However, now B does
not conform. We have thus captured the situation where the statement (3) conveys an obligation to A and if A
conforms, the embedded obligation is conveyed to B.
Example 2: As we mentioned, our approach provides only a partial analysis of iterated modalities. Consider the
following example:
(4) You are required to allow a patient to see his records.
By our analysis, (4) is an obligation on the hospital to provide a permission. Let us suppose that a hospital
introduces such a permission in its policy. Has it conformed to (4)? The problem arises in distinguishing between
claimed permission, and actual permission. A hospital claims that it permits a patient to see his records, by making
an appropriate rule. On the other hand, a hospital actually permits a patient to see his records, by taking an action,
e.g., sending the records via mail. Due to the practical difﬁculties, we focus on claimed permission, and leave open
the problem of analyzing actual permission. In access control systems, permitted actions (other than statements)
are in the control of the system. Every permitted request can be facilitated by the system, and we assume that the
system facilitates accordingly. To our knowledge, this assumption of facilitation is common to all access control
systems.
4 Conclusions
We have motivated and described an access control logic that uses the interaction between saying and deontic
modalities. We proposed two axioms to characterize the interaction (Section 2.1), and showed how these axioms
could be incorporated into a logic programming approach (Section 2.2). In Sections 1 and 3, we discussed how
various constructs that have been studied separately are uniﬁed in our formalism.
Logic programming has been popular in access control [13, 7, 4]. The formalism that we adopted (Section 2.2)
provides a way to integrate the logic programming approaches with the logics of saying, i.e., by evaluating saying
using provability. However, the provability tests can be expensive, and it is of interest to identify tractable frag-
ments. The logic programming restriction to Horn clauses, and the techniques in [8, 12] suggest some directions
toward this end.
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Abstract
Software systems, containing security vulnerabilities, continue to be created and released to consumers. We need to
adopt improved software engineering practices to reduce the security vulnerabilities in modern systems. These practices
should begin with stated security policies and end with systems which are quantitatively, not just qualitatively, more secure.
Currently, contracts have been proposed for reliability and formal veriﬁcation; yet, their use in security is limited. In this
work, we propose a contract-based security assertion monitoring framework (CB SAMF) that is intended to reduce the
number of security vulnerabilities that are exploitable, spanning multiple software layers, to be used in an enhanced systems
development life cycle (SDLC).
1. Introduction
Security has always been a hybrid of art and science as throughout history humans have attempted to protect valuable
assets. Our modern information driven society has placed an increased value on data and the transfer and storage of infor-
mation. More recently, in the last decade, industry and academia have pushed for more secure solutions for information
technology assets and facilities as we have equally seen a rise in malicious hacking and security threats.
Many different approaches have been presented recently toward solving the problem of weak security; however, we
obviously have not yet found a solution since security related attacks continue to persist.
Gary McGraw identiﬁes three trends that have a large inﬂuence on the growth and evolution of the software security
problem [13]. First, connectivity to the Internet has increased the number of attack vectors and the ease of which an attack
can be made. Second, extensibility of software is allowing systems to grow in an incremental fashion which potentially adds
new security vulnerabilities to existing systems. Lastly, the extensive increase of software complexity in modern information
systems leads us to a greater number of vulnerabilities. These three trends will continue and lead us to one, hopefully obvious,
conclusion. Security and dependability vulnerabilities must be resolved during design and testing before being released to
the general public.
Recently, we have observed a promising shift in industry and academia to reduce security vulnerabilities during the
software development life cycle (SDLC), rather than attempt to patch the problem after software is shipped [4, 8, 9, 13]. If
we can reduce security defects early in the SDLC we reduce not only the number of vulnerabilities but also the risk of attack.
While there are areas being researched which target speciﬁc areas of security during the systems development life cycle
(SDLC), a methodology for testing security across multiple software layers is still lacking. We propose a contract-based
security assertion monitoring framework (CB SAMF) that is intended to reduce the number of security vulnerabilities that
are exploitable, spanning multiple software layers, to be used in an enhanced SDLC.
∗This work is partially supported by CPER Nord-Pas-de-Calais/FEDER Campus Intelligence Ambiante.
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The following section will review SDLC and how it relates to security, Section 3 discusses modeling techniques related
to security, Section 4 introduces our proposed approach, Section 5 discusses our contract model, Section 6 expands on the
beneﬁts of contracts for security, and Section 7 provides our concluding remarks.
2 SDLC and Security
Security policy documents are often used by organizations to specify the laws, rules, practices, and principles that govern
how to manage, protect, and transfer sensitive information. These policy documents represent a corner stone from which
software requirements can be built. Requirements in turn drive most modern software/system development life cycles. During
the SDLC there are many opportunities to reduce security vulnerabilities.
A SDLC is typically an iterative and recursive process which clearly identiﬁes the stages that should lead a successful
software project through its entire development life cycle. We are interested with integrating security into every phase of
the SDLC. In fact, several tools and methodologies have already begun to integrate themselves accordingly. We believe,
however, that there is a great deal of work remaining in this area.
The SDLC is still lacking models, methods, and tools that assist in creating more secure and reliable software products.
The audience for this work includes individuals and teams fulﬁlling the following roles during a SDLC: analyst, architect,
developer, tester, maintainer, user, and support. Essentially, all of the development-related stake holders in the SDLC.
Recently Serpanos and Henkel asserted that a uniﬁed approach to dependability and security assessment will let architects
and designers deal with issues in embedded computing platforms [18]. The observation that security and dependability are
interrelated is an important one. Serpanos and Henkel differentiate the two based on security ﬂaws being problems that are
exploited on purpose, while ﬂaws which are exploited by accident would be qualiﬁed as dependability problems. It would be
interesting to have a framework that can support both dependability and security. Thus, we have kept dependability in mind
while designing our framework; however, we focus on security vulnerability monitoring since it is our primary concern.
The goal of our research is to create new methods, models, and tools that integrate into the phases of the SDLC to create
more secure software. We cannot always depend on the consumer to have sufﬁcient protection mechanisms in place on their
systems.1 We need to take a more active role during development to ensure software ships fewer security vulnerabilities.
A modiﬁed form of the SDLC is depicted in Figure 1 showing how various security activities can be integrated into the
iterative and recursive SDLC. Existing SDLC hybrids integrate some of the steps identiﬁed in Figure 1 such as those put
forward by CERT, Microsoft’s Michael Howard and Steve Lipner [9], and others. Nothing has been identiﬁed to date that
guarantees security in software systems; however, our aim is to help reduce the risk associated with security vulnerabilities.
3 Modeling
For many years software developers have been using methodologies meant to simplify and standardize the SDLC. One
notation that has met with a great deal of success, in several methodologies, is the Uniﬁed Modeling Language(UML). UML
does not handle all analysis, design, and implementation requirements for all projects. For example, UML is a natural ﬁt
for most object oriented languages; however, not all projects demand an object oriented approach. Projects that require high
performance, and a low memory footprint, are typically implemented in non-object oriented languages such as C.
Several diagrams that are used in UML are useful in the broader spectrum of all software design projects. For instance, use
case diagrams are very useful in identifying the main functions of a software artifact. In fact, use cases provide the earliest
opportunity to identify security risk in a new SDLC for a given application (other than general risk analysis).
Recently, a more modern addition to use cases, called misuse cases, has been created. Misuse cases, also known as abuse
cases, can be used during requirements analysis [1, 7, 17] leading to a more complete understanding of potential security
risks that need to be mitigated. Hope, McGraw, and Anto´n also mention that misuse cases can be over-used and can lead to
identiﬁcation of a fairly large set of misuse cases that may have little impact on security [7]. With the knowledge of subject
matter experts and security analysts these misuse cases need to be prioritized to balance risk and cost. During development
many risks can be completely mitigated based on the early warnings of the misuse cases. We must recognize, however, that
the probability of a particular misuse may not be completely understood and that some risks may not be identiﬁed until later
in the SDLC. It would be useful to have a mechanism that can identify these security threats in the code and allow for a
monitoring system to be implemented to capture and trace any possible misuse.2
1Consumers often employ intrusion detection systems, ﬁrewalls, and other products to help reduce security risks.
2An example of such an approach would be to use the output of static analysis security tools as the basis of misuse case creation.
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Figure 1. Security activities integrated into the typical waterfall SDLC. Regular SDLC steps are
numbered and linked in diagonal. Security activities are shown horizontally.
Misuse case diagrams can be used to expose a wide variety of threats including privacy violation, denial of service,
privilege escalation, identity or information theft, and network based attacks. As with use case diagrams, misuse case
diagrams are continually reviewed and revised throughout the SDLC. The components that make up a misuse case are
documented already in [1, 7, 17].
Once misuse cases have been identiﬁed we can then proceed with the identiﬁcation of security violation scenarios. One
technique for identiﬁcation of these violation scenarios is the use of an attack tree. Each depth ﬁrst traversal of an attack tree
will identify possible violation scenarios [15].
4 Proposed Approach
Now that we have discussed some of the methods for identifying potential vulnerabilities, we propose a model for mon-
itoring applications for security violations during the middle phases of the SDLC which also allows for the collection of
forensic data based on the prioritized security risks identiﬁed earlier in the SDLC.
This monitoring framework can be integrated early during SDLC. In Figure 2, we depict how the security policy docu-
ment is used as part of the processes identifying the security requirements. Security requirements are then used during the
identiﬁcation of misuse cases (along with normal use cases) that are intended to identify potential vulnerabilities. Once prior-
itized, these misuse cases can then drive the creation of attack trees which further identify intrusion scenarios. The intrusion
scenarios can then be used during design and testing to create sequence diagrams and associated test cases. Finally, during
implementation, sequence diagrams can be generated which identify security vulnerabilities (for example, system/function
calls that have known vulnerabilities). Once a vulnerability has been identiﬁed, a ”contract” can be created using assertions
and additional rules to guard against, or verify, a given vulnerability. These contracts can then in turn be used to generate
security probes that are used during execution to track forensic data in our monitoring framework (CB SAMF).
Consideration should be given as to whether or not output formats from existing tools, such as static analysis tools, may
be translated into a format that may be used by the assertion monitoring framework.
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Figure 2. System ﬂow diagram leading to the use of contracts and monitoring probes.
Ultimately the focus of the initial work will be on the last three nodes of Figure 2 by creating and consuming a contract,
generating the assertion probes, monitoring assertions, and reacting appropriately using the monitoring framework.
5 Contract Model
The notion of a contract used in software engineering is not a new idea [6, 10, 11, 14]. When used for security, however,
we must look outside of the basic preconditions and postconditions that are often used when implementing systems using
contracts and look carefully at what properties need to be speciﬁed in a contract to improve security. Historically, the
precondition speciﬁes when it is appropriate to call a particular feature (function/method), while a postcondition speciﬁes
what is true after a particular feature is called (what has been accomplished by the function/method). 3
Our deﬁnition of contract needs to bind the caller and callee to deal with additional properties involving timing, property
values, and other events.4 For example, a contract that is speciﬁed for a supplier X is consumed by a consumer Y guarantees
that X has fulﬁlled the postcondition(s), provided that Y has satisﬁed the precondition(s). Thus, the contract provides pro-
tection for both parties. The consumer is protected from the supplier since the postconditions have been guaranteed by the
supplier. The supplier is protected from the consumer since the preconditions have been guaranteed by the consumer.
Contracts, as proposed by Meyer, are not suitable for security monitoring.5 The require, guarantee, and references ﬁelds of
the contract, that correspond to the pre, post, and invariants, do not handle all of the necessary attributes of security defects. In
particular, we would propose the addition of several new contractual ﬁelds including context, history, and response. Context
is required since the basic reliability contract above does not factor environmental inﬂuence. History is required since security
vulnerabilities are often complex and are sometimes the result of a series of actions which may occur in parallel. Both context
and history can be useful when dealing with DoS and race-condition vulnerabilities. Finally, response is required so that we
can choose how a particular assertion is handled when an exploitation is detected. We desire the ability to deal with security
assertion failures, not just detect them as would be the case if we used the form of contract proposed by Meyer.6
Our form of contract includes the following ﬁelds:
• Requirements - in the form of preconditions (PRE)
• Guarantees - in the form of postconditions (POST)
• References - in the form of invariants (INV)
• Context - in the form of relevant environmental information (CONT)
• History - in the form of some knowledge keeping construct (HIST)
3Many pre and postconditions are more to do with robustness than security.
4The deﬁnition of binding contract: The legal agreement between two or more entities to perform and/or not perform a set of actions.
5For example,under normal contracts, a false precondition does not guarantee that the system will not process the input. It may still allow certain types
of attacks such as buffer overﬂows to continue.
6The concept of resumption and organized panic for exception handling, used by Meyer, could also fall under our broader response category [14].
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• Response - in the form of a reactive measure (RESP)
Work done by Barringer et al on program monitoring and rule-based runtime veriﬁcation has exposed interesting results
[2, 3]. Speciﬁcally, the work on linear temporal logic (LTL) and program states has been core to several attempts towards
runtime veriﬁcation and is a promising candidate for the notation of our contracts.
Each contract (C) will contain a breakpoint (B) and one or more assertions (A). A breakpoint identiﬁes a monitoring lo-
cation or symbol in the target application. For example, a contract should be able to specify a target function in a program
which affects the state of an assertion. The assertion is a rule which must remain true at the breakpoint. Each assertion has
associated with it zero or more of the security contract extensions (E) mentioned above (context, history, and response). An
assertion can take on one of the following three forms: precondition (PRE), postcondition (POST), or invariant (INV). We
do not represent the assertions types separately since they all take the same form. Each assertion is composed of zero or
more rules (R), relating to the target (remember the breakpoint B), and zero or more monitors (M). The rules, monitors, and
extensions are individually named (N). A rule speciﬁes a property of the state of the program which needs to remain true,
while a monitor enforces one or more rules. The quantiﬁers min and max represent liveness and safety properties respectively
and are important for the boundary cases of a monitor trace. The body of every rule and monitor is speciﬁed as a boolean
valued formula of the syntactic category Form.7 Therefore, each contract may be instantiated using the following grammar8:
C := B (A{E}) {A{E}};
E := {CONT} | {HIST} | {RESP};
A := {R}{M};
R := {max|min}N(T1x1, ..., Tnxn) = F ;
M := mon N = F ;
T := Form | primitive type;
B := symbol | HEX address;
F := exp|true|false|¬F |F1 ∧ F2|F1 ∨ F2|F1 → F2|  F |  F |
F1 · F2|N(F1, . . . , Fn)|xi;
CONT := env N | res N;
HIST := trace N | runningsum N | runningavg N;
RESP := core N | term N | kill N | log N;
When deﬁning rules, the max preﬁx indicates that a given rule deﬁnes a safety property and min indicates that a rule is
a liveness property [3, 16].9 We have also tentatively deﬁned possible extended behaviors for context, history and response
elements and may extend these in the future. Context may specify environmental or resource information (external to the
program) which is needed by the contract. History may contain trace data or statistically relevant information for the contract.
Finally, response may specify an action to perform an assertion is violated.10
From this deﬁnition it is possible to use multiple separate monitors or redirect multiple rules to the same monitor.
6 Beneﬁts of Contract for Security Monitoring
Targeting the identiﬁcation, veriﬁcation and removal of security vulnerabilities from systems is not a trivial task. We chose
the notion of contracts for an assertion framework so that we can state precise properties about a system without having to
7This notation is derived from linear temporal logic (LTL) and is inspired by the EAGLE framework that was proposed by Barringer et al [2, 3].
8Each line is a Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) production. Following is a simpliﬁed description of EBNF notation that we have used:
:= meaning ”is deﬁned as”
| meaning ”or”
, meaning concatenation (used to separate items in a sequence)
{ } meaning zero or more times
{ }- meaning one or more times
[ ] meaning optional item
( ) meaning grouping
; marks the end of a rule
9Safety properties state that if a behavior is unacceptable any extension of that behavior is also unacceptable. Liveness properties state that for a given
requirement, and any ﬁnite duration, the behavior can always be extended such that it satisﬁes the requirement[16, 12].
10Possible responses include the following: core=produce a core dump, term=terminate the task, kill=kill the task, log=produce an audit report for the
event.
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modify the code directly. In order to understand the beneﬁts of these contracts for security monitoring we will brieﬂy discuss
a variety of common security vulnerabilities. An example set of common security problems found in systems is as follows:
• Exploitable Logic Error • Inadequate Parameter Validation Incomplete/Inconsistent
• Inadequate Concurrency Control • Inadequate Authentication/Authorization/Identiﬁcation
• Weak Dependencies/Altered Files • Implicit Sharing of Data and Data Leakage
As we progress with this work we expect that a wide variety of vulnerabilities should be covered by contracts. Exploitable
logic errors are difﬁcult to track down; however, if we can identify environmental, historical, or timing information related to
the expected behavior, contracts can be written to detect misuse. Parameter validation issues can be handled by our pre and
post conditions. Concurrency, accountability, and protocol issues can be tracked through the use of historical, environmental,
pre and post conditions. Finally, the addition of historical and environmental assertions should allow us to track vulnerabilities
related to weak dependencies and data leakage. Furthermore, to give an idea of the types of attacks we should attempt to
counter, a listing of network related attack classes is as follows (derived from [5]):
• Password Stealing • Social Engineering
• Bugs and Back Doors • Authentication Failures
• Protocol Failures • Information Leakage
• Exponential Attacks Viruses and Worms • Denial-of-Service Attacks
• Botnets • Active Attacks
Contracts are not suitable for dealing with all types of attacks. For example, password stealing can occur through the use of a
network sniffer or through the use of social engineering techniques. The ability of an attacker to passively monitory network
trafﬁc will not be prevented through the use of contracts; however, we can use contracts to ensure that security properties of
our systems (derived from our initial security policies) are observed. In the case of password stealing, the password should
never enter a public network in clear text and the protocol used for authentication should not be subject to replay attacks.
These are properties for which we can design contracts.
7 Conclusion
Our enhanced version of contracts provides a novel way to propagate requirements-based security assertions through the
SDLC. Some techniques, such as misuse cases, attack trees, and static analysis, are already providing ways of identifying
potential vulnerabilities during the early phases of the SDLC; however, these approaches can lead to a high rate of false-
positives which consume resources. Our (CB SAMF) is able to help reduce vulnerabilities in multi-layered systems by not
only providing a way to detect if a particular contract is violated, but also provides reactive measures.
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Abstract
We report on a novel approach to (semi-)automatically compile and verify contract-regulated service com-
positions. We specify web services and the contracts governing them as WSBPEL behaviours. We compile
WSBPEL behaviours into the specialised system description language ISPL, to be used with the model checker
MCMAS to verify behaviours automatically. We use the formalism of temporal-epistemic logic suitably ex-
tended to deal with compliance/violations of contracts. We illustrate these concepts using a motivating
example whose state space is approximately 10
6
and discuss experimental results.
1 Introduction
Web services (WS) are now considered one of the key technologies for building new generations of digital busi-
ness systems. Industrial strength distributed applications can be built across organisational boundaries using
services as basic building blocks. When services are combined, a signiﬁcant challenge is to regulate the business
interactions between them. In an environment where previously unknown services are dynamically discovered
and binded, their composition is usually underpinned by binding agreements or “contracts”. Should a contract
be broken by one of the parties, “legal remedies” may be applicable in the form of penalties, additional rights to
some party, and, possibly, additional penalties with respect to third parties.
Conventionally, contracts have been deﬁned and interpreted using natural languages. In electronic business
environments, new formal models and tools are needed to enable the successful enforcement of dynamic contrac-
tual agreements between services. While designing a contract-regulated composition, an important aspect is the
rigorous analysis of possible execution behaviours of individual services as well as the overall behaviour of the
composition. A system made of few localised services may only interact in a small number of ways governed
by a limited set of contract clauses. However when several subsystems coordinate in an open environment, the
contracts binding them are non-trivial and complex, making it diﬃcult to forsee all the possible executions. Ad-
ditionally, while trying to comply to their respective contractually deﬁned behaviours, certain components may
fail, some may be incapacitated to provide the services in the expected timeline, and others still may have to
prioritise certain requests.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach towards the veriﬁcation of services, where transactions are con-
trolled by binding electronic contracts. Veriﬁcation of WS is an active topic of research (e.g., see [16, 18]).
However it has so far been concerned with checking safety and liveness properties only. Our proposed framework,
builds upon existing work in the domain of multi agent systems (MAS) [17, 1]. We take the view that a web
service can be modelled as an “agent” [5]. When WS are phrased as a contract-regulated MAS, several properties
become worth studying, including various notions of correctness and violations of the contracts during a run, the
evolution of the agents’ knowledge about themselves, the contracts and the expected peers’ behaviours, etc.
The speciﬁcation and analysis of agent behaviour in a MAS has been widely explored. Several formal models
have been investigated to specify formally and unambiguously the behaviour of the system. Many of these are
based on modal logic, including temporal, epistemic, and deotic logic. Developments in veriﬁcation of MAS via
model checking techniques [15, 4, 9] has kept pace with the advancement in the speciﬁcation techniques. Along
with temporal languages, it is now also possible to verify a variety of modalities describing the informational and
intentional state of the agents.
The above leads us to explore the veriﬁcation of contract-based WS implemented by means of MAS model
checkers. To this end, we propose a veriﬁcation methodology where services or “contract parties” (CP) are
speciﬁed using WSBPEL [13]. The contractually correct behaviours for every CP are also speciﬁed in WSBPEL.
In our approach, a compiler of our design takes as input both these behaviour descriptions, and generates an
ISPL program, which is fed to the symbolic model checker MCMAS for veriﬁcation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy introduce WSBPEL, ISPL and MCMAS.
Section 3 introduces a motivating example and some of its key properties. Section 4 presents our proposed
framework. Section 5 discusses the implementation of the compiler and Section 6 gives experimental results from
veriﬁcation. We conclude in Section 7.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 MCMAS and ISPL
MCMAS [11] is a specialised model checker for the veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems. It builds on symbolic
model checking via OBDDs as its underlying technique, and supports CTL, epistemic and deontic logic. The
current version of MCMAS [10] has the following features: (1) Support for variables of the following types:
Boolean, enumeration and bounded integer. Arithmetic operations can be performed on bounded integers. (2)
Counterexample/witness generation for quick and eﬃcient display of traces falsifying/satisfying properties. (3)
Support for fairness constraints. This is useful in eliminating unrealistic behaviours. (4) Support for interactive
execution mode. This allows users to step through the execution of their model.
MCMAS uses ISPL as its input language. A system encoded in ISPL is composed of the environment e
and a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ A has a set of local states Li and a set of local actions
Acti. The protocol function of agent i, Pi : Li → 2Acti, deﬁnes for each local state li ∈ Li the set of actions
that are allowed to be executed in li. Similarly, the environment has its local states Le, local actions Acte and
protocol function Pe. The transition relation among local states of agent i is deﬁned by the evolution function
Evi : Li × Act1 × · · · ×Actn ×Acte → Li. The deﬁnition of Evi suggests that the local actions of an agent can
be observed by other agents. The evolution function Eve of the environment is deﬁned in the same way.
To reason about the behaviours of agent i with respect to correctness [12], Li is further partitioned into
two disjoint sets: a non-empty set Gi of allowed (“green”) states and a set Ri of disallowed (“red”) states. In
this paper, we use green states to denote the behaviours in compliance with contracts and red states to denote
violations, by means of temporal epistemic properties.
ISPL allows user deﬁned atomic propositions over global states of the system. A global state is composed of
a local state from every agent and the environment. The logic formulae to be checked by MCMAS are deﬁned
over the atomic propositions.
2.2 WSBPEL
WSBPEL [13] is a popular and de facto industrial standard for describing service composition. The speciﬁcation
has been elaborately explained in several web service based literature [13]. is highly recommended.
WSBPEL deﬁnes a model and an XML based grammar for the orchestration of executable and abstract
business processes. A BPEL process deﬁnes the interaction between partners. The speciﬁcation provides the
control logic to coordinate arbitrarily complex web services, deﬁned in WSDL. A BPEL process can interact
synchronously or asynchronously with its partners, i.e., its clients, and with the services the process orchestrates.
The building blocks for a BPEL process are the descriptions of the parties participating in the process, the
data that ﬂows through the process and the activities performed during the execution of the process. Some
examples of activities include “receive”, “reply”, “assign”, “sequence” and “wait”. WSBPEL also introduces
systematic mechanisms for dealing with business exceptions and processing faults. Moreover, WSBPEL introduces
a mechanism to deﬁne how individual or composite activities within a unit of work are to be compensated in
cases where exceptions occur or a partner requests reversal.
3 A Motivating Case Study
In this section we present a composition of services, regulated as a pre-deﬁned contract. The case study was ﬁrst
presented in earlier work on verifying service composition with MCMAS [1]. Here, we focus on the automatic
compilation of services from WSBPEL into ISPL.
In the example, the participating contract parties comprise: a principal software provider (PSP ), a software
provider (SP ), a software client (C), an insurance company (I), a testing agency (T ), a hardware supplier (H),
and a technical expert (E). The high-level workﬂow of the composition is deﬁned as follows: Client C wants to
get a software developed and deployed on hardware supplied by H . To deploy the software, the technical expert
E is needed. Components of the software are provided by diﬀerent software providers. We consider two software
providers here: PSP and SP . The components need to be integrated by the providers before the software is
delivered to C.
The software integration is carried out by PSP , when SP delivers its component. PSP and SP twice update
each other and C about the progress of the software development. Should the client like any changes in the
software, he can request them before the second round of updates. Any change suggested by the client after
the second update is considered a violation and the client is charged a penalty. The client can recover from this
violation by paying the penalty or by withdrawing the request for changes. If PSP and SP do not send their
updates as per schedule, this is also considered a violation and they are charged a penalty. Every update is
followed by a payment in part by the client C to the PSP . Payment to SP is handled by PSP and is done once
the software is deployed successfully.
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PSP ’s obligations:
1. Update SP and C twice about the progress of the software.
2. Integrate the components and send them to T for testing.
3. If components fail, integrate the revised software and send them for testing.
4. Make payment to SP after successful deployment of software.
C’s obligations:
1. Request changes before the second round of updates.
2. Pay penalty if changes are requested after second round of updates.
3. Make payment to the PSP after every update.
Figure 1: Obligations of Contract parties
Agent Violation condition Recovery
1 PSP - does not send messages to SP and/or C in the ﬁrst
and/or second run of update.
pay penalty charge
2 - does not send payment to SP . no
3 SP - does not send update messages to PSP or C. pay penalty charge
4 - does not send its components to PSP . no
5 C - request changes after second update. pay penalty charge or withdraw changes
6 - does not send the payment to PSP . no
7 T - does not send the testing report to C, PSP and/or
SP .
no
8 H - does not deliver the hardware system to C. no
9 - ignores the deployment failure. no
10 E - does not deploy the software on the hardware system. no
11 I - does not process the claim of C. no
Figure 2: Agents and their violation conditions.
PSP integrates the components and sends the integrated component to T for testing. Results from testing
are made available to all the parties, i.e., PSP , SP , and C. If the integration test fails, the components are
revised and tested again. Components can be revised twice. If the third test fails, C cancels the contract with
PSP . If the testing succeeds, C invokes I to get the software insured. C then invokes H to order the hardware.
Finally C invokes E to get the software deployed. If the software cannot be deployed then the hardware and the
components have to be re-evaluated. Components can be revised twice. If the third test fails C always cancels
the contract with PSP and H . Figure 1 illustrates the obligations of the PSP and C.
From the above scenario it can be seen that contracts between services can be usefully employed to illustrate
the notion of correctness in behaviour. Any deviation from the behaviour identiﬁed in the contract is considered
a violation. The contract might in some cases also specify mechanisms for recovering from violations.
The contract between various parties can be violated in many ways. Figure 2 illustrates informally some of
the conditions under which some local violations may occur.
4 Veriﬁcation framework
In this section we discuss our framework for the veriﬁcation of contracts. Our approach targets two levels of
veriﬁcation:
• conformance of the behaviour of an individual contract party to its contractually correct behaviour.
• conformance of the combined behaviour of all the contract parties to the overall contract.
For the sake of clarity in the ﬁgure and the paper, we elaborate on the components of the architecture and the
veriﬁcation methodology, only for contract party C1. Note that a similar mechanism would be replicated for all
the contract parties in the composition.
1. Natural language contracts: Conventionally contracts are speciﬁed in a natural language. A contract
stipulates the obligations of parties entering the contract. It deﬁnes behaviours that are considered to be
violation of some obligations, and may outline penalties and/or recovery actions from the violations. For
veriﬁcation, a conventional contract is encoded as an e-contract in WSBPEL.
2. Contract party: A contract party (CP) is a service, that is a ﬁrst class citizen of the contract regulated
composition. The behaviour of a CP is governed by the rights, obligations and violations stipulated in
the contract, and agreed to by the CP. The overall fulﬁllment of a contract depends on the adherence of
each CP in the composition to its speciﬁed behaviour. In our framework, each contract party is an agent
with well deﬁned green and red states corresponding to states of compliance and violation respectively. Our
proposed methodology aims to verify the adherence of each agent’s behaviour to what has been speciﬁed
as contractually correct behavior for the agent.
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3. Contract party/agent behaviour: The behaviour of an agent can be deﬁned in terms of a two-part
behaviour: all possible behaviours and contractually correct behaviours. In order to automate the veriﬁca-
tion, we encode both these behaviours in BPEL. Note that it is possible to describe contractually correct
behaviours using a speciﬁcation language, tailor-made for describing contracts e.g., [14]. However, keeping
both these behaviours at the same level of abstraction, provides the system designer with the ﬂexibility
needed to combine and compile the behaviours into a model suitable for veriﬁcation.
For an agent, we refer to its all possible behaviours as BPEL-behaviour and the contractually correct be-
haviours as its BPEL-contract. Note that both the behaviours are inter-dependent and replicate information
such as variable and action description for the agent, in their speciﬁcation.
4. Compiler: The compiler is a novel and integral component of our architecture. The compiler takes as
input the BPEL-behaviour and the BPEL-contract for an agent and combines them to generate an ISPL
program. The compiler parses the BPEL-behaviour to generate a partial model that enumerates the local
states but abstracts from deﬁning red and green states. The BPEL-contract is then parsed to enumerate
the green/red states for the agent. The internal details of the compiler are illustrated in Section 5.
5. ISPL and MCMAS: The ISPL program compiled semi-automatically from the BPEL speciﬁcation, en-
codes the overall and desired behaviour of an agent. The program is fed to MCMAS for veriﬁcation of the
agent’s behaviour.
5 Implementation
The core component of our framewrok is the compiler that translates a WSBPEL speciﬁcation into an ISPL
program. It generates basic atomic propositions and properties automatically for veriﬁcation.
Given the two speciﬁcations (BPEL-behaviours and BPEL-contracts), we propose a three step methodology
to generate the corresponding ISPL program:
1. We represent a BPEL process by an automaton. The BPEL-behaviour is ﬁrst read into memory, followed by
the BPEL-contract. Both behaviours are translated into automata. We use behaviour automata to denote
the automata representing the BPEL-behaviour and contract automata for the BPEL-contract.
2. For each state in the contract automata, we look for its counterpart in the behaviour automata and label
it as green. We then label all other states in the behaviour automata as red. Based on these labels, basic
properties speciﬁed in temporal-epistemic logic are generated.
3. The labelled behaviour automata and the properties are written to the ISPL ﬁle input to the checker.
In what follows, we discuss the methodology in detail.
5.1 Translating BPEL programs into automata
The compiler uses the following rules to do the translation.
• “Assign”, “receive”, “invoke” and “empty” activities are translated into transitions connecting the respec-
tive source state and target state. A “sequence” activity is translated into a sequence of transitions.
• An “if” activity is translated into two sequences of transitions, one for the if-branch and another for the
else-branch. The ﬁrst transition in the if-branch uses the condition in the “if” activity as its guard, while
the ﬁrst transition in the else-branch uses the negation of the condition as the guard. A “while” activity
is translated in the same way as an “if” activity except that the target state of the last transition and the
source state of the ﬁrst transition in the if-branch are the same.
• “OnMessage” activities and “onAlarm” activities in a “pick” activity are translated into transitions with a
common source state.
• A branch in a “ﬂow” activity is translated into a separate automaton. The beginning and the end of these
automata are synchronised with the automaton representing the BPEL process. In doing so, we diﬀer
from [8], where a “ﬂow” is translated such that: all branches are executed sequentially and all possible
permutations are represented as a single automaton.
• Fault handlers and exceptions are translated into transitions as well. The latter transition assigns a speciﬁc
value to a variable and the guard of the former transition tests if the variable has this value. Other kinds
of handlers are dealt with in the same way. Theoretically, in every state where an exception could happen
a copy of the exception/handler transition is produced using this state as its source state (note that these
copies have the same target state). Thus one transition would be replicated many times. In practice,
however, we have a succinct way to implement it due to the ﬂexibility of ISPL, as discussed later.
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As remarked in the literature review, much work has been appeared on translating BPEL into model checkers’
input languages, e.g., [8, 7, 2]. However, only few of them can process all BPEL structures. A detailed discussion
can be found in [2].
5.2 Colouring the model
We use the green and red of labelling in ISPL code to diﬀerentiate between contractually correct and incorrect
behaviours, as shown in Figure 3. This is possible because the BPEL-contract speciﬁcation deﬁnes behaviours
Figure 3: Labelling behaviours
included also in the BPEL-behaviour speciﬁcation. Labelling the states in the behaviour automata is done as
follows:
1. The initial state of a behaviour automaton is labelled as green.
2. For every transition in the contract automata, we ﬁnd the same transition in the behaviour automata and
label its target state as green.
3. For all states that are not green, we label them as red.
We do not look for matched states directly because the states are named in a numerical way and, therefore,
the same state in the behaviour automata and the contract automata might have diﬀerent names. However,
transitions get their name from the BPEL activities, each of which has a unique name.
After the labelling process ﬁnishes, the compiler encodes three kinds of atomic propositions, which are used
to deﬁne basic formulae to be checked in the following way. For each BPEL process p, we deﬁne
• an atomic proposition pgreen holding in all green states of the process;
• an atomic proposition pend holding in the last state of process p;
• an atomic proposition predi holding in the corresponding red state i.
Two kinds of basic properties are generated based on the atomic properties. For each BPEL process p, deﬁne
E (pgreen U pend). (1)
This property speciﬁes that p has a way to conduct a whole run in compliance with its contract obligations. For
each atomic proposition pred ∈ {pred0, pred1, . . .}, deﬁne
EF pred. (2)
This property represents a test to check whether a agent may violate its contractual behaviours.
The above properties verify the basic behaviours of contract parties. More properties can be manually added
to the automatically generated ISPL code in order to test other interesting behaviours (see below).
5.3 Generating an ISPL program
Once the behaviour automatas are labelled, they are ready to be written to an ISPL ﬁle for veriﬁcation. Each
automaton is mapped to an agent in the ﬁle. Let A = {1, . . . , n} be the set of automata and A = {1, . . . , n} the
set of agents. Here we only enumerate the key steps to generate an agent i ∈ A from an automaton Ai ∈ A.
1. Local states generation. A local state l ∈ Li is a valuation for the set of local variables V ari. Thus, the
generation of Li is performed through the generation of V ari. If Ai is generated from a BPEL process p,
then
V ari = V arp ∪ {state},
where V arp is the set of variables deﬁned in p and state is an additional enumeration variable. Each value
of state represents a unique state of Ai. If Ai is a “ﬂow” branch in p, then






⊆ V arp is the set of variables used by Ai. In order to reduce the agent’s state space, the
compiler monitors the usage of every variable v ∈ V arp. If v is never read by any transitions in Ai, then it
is discarded.
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2. Local actions generation. Acti is obtained from the transitions of Ai. Each transition is mapped into an
action; additionally if two transitions have the same name, they are mapped into the same action.
3. Protocol generation. Let l(state) be the value of variable state in state l ∈ Li and El the set of allowed
actions in l. For any transition t whose source state is represented by l(state), the action to which t
is mapped is included in El. Obviously, two states l1, l2 ∈ Li have the same set of allowed actions if
l1(state) = l2(state).
4. Evolution function generation. Each transition in Ai is translated to an evolution item. For a transition t
with source state s1, target state s2, and guard c, the evolution item is deﬁned to be of the following form:
state=s2 if state=s1 and c and Action=t.
This item means that if in the current state, the variable state has value s1 and the guard c is satisﬁed,
the execution of t makes agent i move to a state where state has value s2. If t is synchronised with another
transition t′ in the automaton Aj ∈ A, then the evolution item is
state=s2 if state=s1 and c and Action=t and Aj .Action=t’.
If t assigns a value expr to a variable v, the assignment is translated on the left side of “if”, i.e.
state=s2 and v=expr if · · · .
If there are multiple copies of t, e.g., t represents a fault handler, we use the following form to specify an
evolution item for all copies:
state=s if (state=s1 or state=s2 or . . .) and c and Action=t and · · · ,
where s1 and s2 are the source states of these copies and s is their target state. If t is allowed in all states,
the above form can be simpliﬁed to
state=s if c and Action=t and · · · .
6 Experimental Analysis
We evaluated the compilation and veriﬁcation mechanism on the case study illustrated in Section 3. We rep-
resented the composition in terms of a WSBPEL orchestration. The following BPEL code represents the full
behaviour of the client C, when receiving updates from PSP and SP . Note that for brevity, only essential infor-
mation is shown. The BPEL-contract is the same as BPEL-behaviour except that it deﬁnes only contractually

















The translation generates the following ISPL program for the client.
Agent Client
Vars:
state : { Client_0, Client_1, ...};

















The following listing gives an example about how to deﬁne atomic propositions and properties in ISPL.
Evaluation
Client_green if Client.state = Client_0 or
Client.state = Client_1 or ...;
Client_end if Client.state = Client_51;








In addition to the basic properties automatically generated by the compiler, we manually added a few more
complex properties to the model. Those properties were also studied in [1]. Some atomic propositions, e.g.,
“receiveSoftware” and “softwareTested”, are also added to the ISPL code manually. In particular, we considered
the following:
• Whenever PSP is in a compliance state, he knows the contract can be eventually fulﬁlled successfully.
AG(PSP green → KPSP EF (PSP end))
• There exists a path where C is always in compliance with the contract until he eventually receives the
software.
E(C green U receiveSoftware)
• PSP knows that it is possible that PSP , SP , C, I, H , T and E are all in compliance until the software is
delivered.
KPSP E(all green U softwareDelivered),
where all green represents PSP green∧SP green∧C green∧ T Green∧H green∧E green∧ I green.
• There is a trace in which the client is always in contract compliant states until the software is delivered
(while the client remains compliant) before the client enters a violation.
E(C green U E((C green ∧ softwareDeployed) U ¬C green))
The generated ISPL model was encoded automatically by MCMAS by using 134 BDD variables: 49 BDD variables
for local states (the same number of BDD variables are constructed for the transition relation) and 36 for local
actions. The total number of global states is approximately 106. On a machine running Linux Fedora 8 x86 64
version (kernel 2.6.24.3-50) on Intel Core 2 Duo E4500 2.2GHz with 4GB memory, it took about 24 seconds with
34 MB memory space for MCMAS to verify 25 properties.
In this example, all basic properties hold on the model, which means not only all parties can fulﬁl their
contractual obligations successfully, but also that all the violations shown in Figure 2 can actually happen.
Amongst the manually added properties, the ﬁrst one does not hold. The reason is that even though PSP fulﬁlls
its contractual obligations, the software might not pass testing hence not be deployed. For a similar reason, the
third one does not hold either.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a novel technique for the veriﬁcation of contract-regulated service compositions. In
our approach, services and contracts are speciﬁed as WSBPEL behaviours. We showed how these behaviours
could be semi-automatically compiled into ISPL, and then veriﬁed using the symbolic model checker MCMAS.
The salient feature of the approach is the possibility of checking agent compliance with respect to contracts and
the potential of compiling a fairly large subset of BPEL constructs to ISPL. We illustrated the methodology using
a realistic case study with a reasonably large state space.
It is worth mentioning that there are two limitations in the current framework: (1) Since MCMAS cannot
handle real-time systems, some BPEL constructs such as deadline and timeout have to be translated into non-
deterministic behaviours. For real-time properties, a secondary model checker, such as Uppaal [3] or Verics[6],
can be integrated into the framework. (2) The contracts that can be dealt with are written in natural languages
and translated into BPEL code manually. Nowadays, some contracting languages, e.g., [14], have been proposed
in order to construct electronic contracts to be processed by computers. Currently, we are working on compiling
electronic contracts into ISPL to allow more automation.
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1 The Future Internet
With the advent of the next generation java servlet on the smartcard, the Future Internet
will be composed by web servers and clients silently yet busily running on high end
smart cards in our phones and our wallets. Thus we can no longer accept the current
security model where programs can be downloaded on our machines just because they
are vaguely “trusted”. We need to know what they do in more precise details.
The End of Trust in the Web. The World Wide Web evolved rapidly in 90’s and the
notion has changed from a network to a platform where people migrate desktop appli-
cations. The security model of the current version of the web is based on an assumption
that the good guys develop their application, expose it on the web, and then let other
good guys using it while stopping bad guys from misusing it.
The business trend of outsourcing processes or the construction of virtual organi-
zations have slightly complicated this initially simple picture. Now running a “service”
means that different service (sub)components can be dynamically chosen and different
partners are chosen to offer those (sub)services. Hence we need different trust estab-
lishment mechanisms (see e.g. [10]).
This assumption is no longer true for the new world of Web 2.0 and the Future In-
ternet. Even now a user downloads a multitude of communicating applications ranging
from P2P clients to desktop search engines, each of them ploughing through the user’s
platform, and springing back with services from and to the rest of the world. To deal
with the untrusted code either .NET or Java can exploit the mechanism of permissions.
Permissions are assigned to enable execution of potentially dangerous or costly func-
tionality, such as starting various types of connections. The drawback of permissions
is that after assigning a permission the user has very limited control over how the per-
mission is used. Conditional permissions that allow and forbid use of the functionality
depending on such factors as bandwidth or the previous actions of the application itself
(e.g. access to sensitive ﬁles) are also out of reach. Once again the consequence is that
either applications are sandboxed (and thus can do almost nothing), or the user decided
that they are trusted and then they can do almost everything.
The mechanism of signed assemblies from trusted third parties does not solve the
problem either. Currently a signature on a piece of code only means that the application
 Research partly supported by the Projects EU-FP6-IST-STREP-S3MS, EU-FP6-IP-
SENSORIA, and EU-FP7-IP-MASTER. We would like to thank Eric Vetillard for pointing
to us the domain of Next Generation Java Card as the Challenge for the Future Internet.
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comes from the software factory of the signatory, but there is no clear deﬁnition of what
guarantees it offers. It essentially binds the software with nothing. We built our security
models on the assumption that we could trust the vendors (or at least some of them).
The examples from reputable companies such as Channel 4 (or BBC, Sky TV etc.) show
that this is no longer possible. Still we really want to download a lot of software.
The Smart(Card) Future of the Web. The model that we have described above is es-
sentially the web of the personal computers. None of the users complaining about 4oD
[14] have considered their PC or their Web platform “broken” because it allowed other
people to make use of it. They did not consider returning their PC for repair. They
considered themselves being gullible users ripped off by an untrusted vendor.
Another domain at the opposite side of the psychological spectrum is smartcard
technology. The technology enjoyed worldwide deployment in 90’s with Java Card Ap-
plets and their strict security conﬁnement. At the beginning of the millennium, many
applications such as large SIM cards and identity management businesses are imple-
mented on smart-cards to address mobile devices security challenges.
The smartcard technology evolved with larger memories, USB and TCP/IP support
and the development of the Next-Generation Java Card platform with Servlet engine.
The Future Internet will be composed by those embedded Java Card Platforms running
on high end smart cards in our phones and our wallets, each of them connecting to
the internet and performing secure transactions with distributed servers and desktop
browsers without complicated middleware or special purpose readers.
We still want to download a huge amount of software on our phones but there is
a huge psychological difference from a consumer perspective. If our PC is sluggish in
responding, we did something wrong or downloaded the wrong software, if our phone
is sluggish, it is broken. Moreover, in the realm of next generation Java card platforms
we cannot just download a software without knowing what it does. The smart card web
platform must have a way to check what is downloading.
2 Security by Contract for the Smart Future Internet
In the previous FLACOS workshop we [11] have proposed the notion of Security-by-
Contract (S×C)[5, 4]. In S×C we augment mobile code with a claim on its security
behavior (an application’s contract) that could be matched against a mobile platform’s
policy before downloading the code. A digital signature does not just certify the origin
of the code but also bind together the code with a contract with the main goal to pro-
vide a semantics for digital signatures on mobile code. This framework is a step in the
transition from trusted code to trustworthy code.
S×C Workﬂow. At development time the mobile code developers are responsible for
providing a description of the security behavior that their code ﬁnally provides. Such a
code might also undergo a formal certiﬁcation process by the developer’s own company,
the smart card provider, a mobile phone operator, or any other third party for which the
application has been developed. By using suitable techniques such as static analysis,
monitor in-lining, or general theorem proving, the code is certiﬁed to comply with the
40
Fig. 1. SxC Workﬂow
developer’s contract. Subsequently, the code and the security claims are sealed together
with the evidence for compliance (either a digital signature or a proof) and shipped
for deployment. At deployment time, the target platform follows a workﬂow similar to
the one depicted in Fig.1 (see [19]). First, it checks that the evidence is correct. Such
evidence can be a trusted signature or a proof that the code satisﬁes the contract (one
can use Proof-Carrying-Code (PCC) techniques to check it.
As we have evidence that the contract is trustworthy, the platform checks, that the
claimed policy is compliant with the policy that our platform wants to enforce. If it
is, then the application can be run without further ado. It is a signiﬁcant saving from
in-lining a security monitor. In case that at run-time we decide to still monitor the ap-
plication then, as with vaccination, we inline a number of checks into the application so
that any undesired behavior can be immediately stopped or corrected.
Contract for the Smart Future Internet. A contract is a formal complete and correct
speciﬁcation of the behavior of an application for what concerns relevant security ac-
tions (Virtual Machine API Calls,Web Messages etc). By signing the code the developer
certiﬁes that the code complies with the stated claims on its security-relevant behavior.
A policy is a formal complete speciﬁcation of the acceptable behavior of applications
to be executed on the platform for what concerns relevant security actions.
Technically, a contract can be a security automaton in the sense of Schneider [8],
and it speciﬁes an upper bound on the security-relevant behavior of the application:
the sequences of security-relevant events that an application can generate are all in the
language accepted by the security automaton. We can have a slightly more sophisticated
approach using Bu¨chi automata [18] if we also want to cover liveness properties that can
be enforced by Edit automata. This deﬁnition can be sufﬁcient for theoretical purposes
but it is hardly acceptable for any practical use.
A variant of the PSLANG language [1] has been proposed for S×C for mobile code
(.NET and Java). The formal counterpart of the language is the notion of automata
modulo theory [12] where atomic actions are replaced by expressions that can ﬁnitely
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capture inﬁnite values of API parameters. For the smart future internet, we need to
identify a suitable language for the speciﬁcation of contracts and policies at a level of
abstraction that is suitable and can be used for all S×C phases (Fig.1)
Application-contract compliance. Static analysis can be used at development time to
increase conﬁdence in the contract. With static analysis, program analysis and veriﬁca-
tion algorithms are used in an attempt to prove that the application satisﬁes its contract.
The major advantage of static analysis is that it does not impose any runtime over-
head, and that it shows that all possible executions of a program comply with the con-
tract. The major disadvantage is that the problem of checking application-contract com-
pliance is in general undecidable, and so automatic static analysis tools will typically
only support restricted forms of contracts, or restricted forms of applications, or the
tool will be conservative in the sense that it will reject applications that are actually
compliant, but the tool fails to ﬁnd a proof for this.
The programs and services running on the embedded servlet will be signiﬁcantly
more complex and have actions at different level of abstractions whose full security
implications can be understood by considering all abstraction levels at once. The chal-
lenges for static analysis is that with expressive notions of security contracts, verifying
application-contract compliance is actually as hard as verifying compliance with an
arbitrary speciﬁcation [16]. Moreover, contracts for applications in the Smart Future
Internet will have a complexity that is comparable to the level of abstractions of current
concurrent models that are used for model checking hardware and software systems (in
1010 states or transitions and beyond).
A standard approach to make program veriﬁcation and analysis algorithms scale to
large programs is to make them modular of the program independently. This is partic-
ularly hard for application-contract compliance checking, because the security state of
the contract is typically a global state, and the structure of the contract and its security
state might not align with the structure of the application. Annotations are required on
all methods to specify how they interact with the security state, and not only on meth-
ods that are relevant for the contract at hand. This annotation overhead is prohibitive,
so a key challenge is to look for ways to reduce the annotation burden. An interesting
research question is whether a program transformation (similar to the security-passing
style transformation used for reasoning about programs sandboxed by stack inspection
[17]) can improve this situation.
A second approach to address scalability is to give up soundness of the analysis,
and to use the contract as a model of the application in order to generate security tests
by applying techniques from Model Based Testing [20]. Losing soundness is a major
disadvantage: an application may pass all the generated tests and still turn out to violate
the contract once ﬁelded. However, the advantages are also important: no annotations
on the application source code are needed, and the tests generated from the contract can
be easily injected in the standard platform testing phase, thus making this approach very
practical. A challenge to be addressed here is how to measure the coverage of such se-
curity tests. When are there enough tests to give a reasonable assurance about security?
It is easy to automatically generate a huge amount of tests from the contract. Hence it
is important to know how many tests are sufﬁcient, and whether a newly generated test
increases the coverage of the testing suite.
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Matching Contract and Policy on the Smart Future Internet. We must show that the
behavior described by the contract is acceptable according to our platform policy. The
operation of matching the application’s claim with the platform policy requires that the
contract is trustworthy, i.e. the application and the contract are sealed together with a
digital signature when shipped for deployment or by shipping a proof that can checked
automatically. A simple solution is to build upon automata theory, interpret contract
and policy as automata and use language inclusion . Given two such automata AutC
(representing the contract) and AutP (representing the policy), we have a match when
the language accepted by AutC is a subset of the language accepted by AutP .
Once the policy and the contract are represented as automata then one can either use
language inclusions [12] or simulation [13] to check whether the contract is acceptable
according our platform policy. This solution is only partial because the automata that we
have envisaged do not store the values of the arguments of allowed/disallowed APIs. In
order to do this Contracts and policies for the future internet must be history-dependent:
the arguments of past allowed actions (API calls, WS invocations, SOAP messages)
may inﬂuence the evolution of future access control decision in a policy.
Further, in our current implementation of the matcher that runs on a mobile phone,
security states of the automata are represented by variables over ﬁnite domains e.g.
smsMessagesSent ranges between 0 to 5. [1, 2]. A possible solution could be to extend
the work on ﬁnite-memory automata [9] by Kaminski and Francez or other works [15]
that studied automata and logics on strings over inﬁnite alphabets.
An approach to address scalability is to give up soundness of the matching and use
algorithms for simulation and testing. A challenge to be addressed is how to measure
the coverage of approximate matching. Which value should give a reasonable assurance
about security? Should it be an absolute value? Should it be in proportion of the number
of possible executions? In proportion to the likely executions? An interesting approach
could be to recall to life a neglected section on model checking by Courcoubetis et al
[3] in which they traded off a better performance of the algorithm in change for the
possibility of erring with a small probability.
Inlining a monitor on Future Internet Applications. What happens if matching fails?
or what happens if we do not trust the evidence that the code satisﬁes the contract? If
we look back at Fig.1 monitor inlining of the contract can provide strong assurance of
compliance. With monitor inlining [7], code rewriting is used to push contract checking
functionality into the program itself. The intention is that the inserted code enforces
compliance with the contract, and otherwise interferes with the execution of the target
program as little as possible. Monitor inlining is a well-established and efﬁcient ap-
proach [6] however a major open question is how to deal with concurrency efﬁciently.
Servents in the Smart Future Internet will need to monitor the concurrent inter-
actions of tens of untrusted multithreaded programs. An inliner needs to protect the
inlined security state against race conditions. So all accesses to the security state will
happen under a lock. A key design choice for an inlining algorithm is whether to lock
across security relevant API calls, or to release the lock before doing the API call, and
reacquiring it when the API call returns.
The ﬁrst choice (locking across calls) is easier to get secure, as there is a strong
guarantee that the updates to the security state happen in the correct order. This is much
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trickier for an inliner that releases the lock during API calls. However, an inliner that
locks across calls can introduce deadlocks in the inlined program, because some of
the security relevant API calls will themselves block. And even if it does not lead to
deadlock, acquiring a lock across a potentially blocking method call can cause serious
performance penalties. A partial solution is by partitioning the security state into dis-
joint parts, and replacing the global lock, by per-part locks. This improves efﬁciency,
but depending on application and policy, it can still introduce deadlocks. The challenge
is how to inline a monitor into a concurrent program so that it cannot create a deadlock
in future interactions with other unknown programs yet to be downloaded.
The ability to resist to changes in context (i.e. new concurrent programs downloaded
after the inlined program) is essential for usability. The inlined version of 4oD should
not get in the way if later on I want to download a (inlined) role-playing game. It is
possible that two malicious software downloaded at different instants try to cooperate
in order to steal some data. The security monitor should be able to spot them but not
be deadlocked by them. If inlining is performed by the code producer, or by a third
party, the code consumer (client that runs the application) needs to be convinced that
inlining has been performed correctly. Without a secure transfer of the guarantees of
application-contract compliance to the client, it is easy for an attacker to modify either
the application or the contract, or for an application developer to lie about the contract.
Cryptographic signatures by a trusted (third) party is a ﬁrst solution even if it
transfer the risk from the technical to the legal domain. The trusted party vouches for
application-contract compliance. Note the difference with the use of signatures in the
traditional mobile device security model. In the security-by-contract approach, a signa-
ture has a clear semantics [5]: the third party claims that the application respects the
supplied contract. Moreover, what is important is the fact that the decision whether the
contract is acceptable or not remains with the end user. If an application claims that it
will not connect to the internet and instead it does, at least you can bring the signatory
to the court for fraudulent commercial claims.
Another solution is whether we can use the techniques PCC for this. In PCC, the
code producer produces a proof that the code has certain properties, and ships this proof
together with the code to the client. By verifying the proof, the client can be sure that
the code indeed has the properties that it claims to have.
The difﬁculty of the endeavour is that the code has not been produced to be veriﬁed
compliant against a security property but usually to actually do some business. In other
words, the code producer is not aware of the property and the property producer is not
aware of the code. In this scenario veriﬁcation is clearly an uphill path.
When we inline a contract we know precisely what code we are inlining and also
what property the inlined code should satisfy. So, we can ask the inliner to do this
automatically for us and ask them to generate the proof directly. This should make it
relatively easy to check that code complies with the contract: the generation of a proof
should be easier, and the size of the proof would also be acceptable for inlined programs.
The challenge is to identify automatic inlining mechanisms that inline a monitor for a
security contract and generate an easily checkable proof for industrial applications in
the Smart Future Internet.
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Service Oriented Architectures: 




Service oriented architectures are expected to become the foundational layer for tomorrow's 
information systems and are influencing already many application areas.  The principles of SOA have 
evolved along applications, but the goals of SOA are far more ambitious, requiring a decent formal, 
abstract basis, and in particular adequate modelling techniques. This paper surveys some problems, 
discusses some elements of an abstract basis of SOA and outlines a generic modelling technique. 
1. Introduction 
The potential of service oriented architectures (SOA) is widely acknowledged. Recent voices from 
industrial labs praise SOA as "THE most relevant emerging software paradigm", "a substantial change 
of view, as it happens at most once each decade", "the next fundamental software revolution after OO" 
or "much more than just another type of software". These architectures are expected to become the 
foundational layer for tomorrow's information systems and are influencing already many application 
areas like Enterprise Application Integration, Software Engineering, Systems Management, Data 
provisioning, BPI, B2B – to name but just a few. SOAs support the quick and efficient coupling of 
encapsulated software components ("services"), as well as flexibility and convenience of interaction. 
Historically, SOA has emerged from two very pragmatic sources and backgrounds: business process 
technology and Web service technology. So far, SOA is frequently conceived as a means to equip 
business processes with web-based communication facilities. 
The goals of SOA are however far more ambitious: SOA is the next step in trying to bring some order 
(modularization, proper interfaces, standardization) to enterprise computing and enterprise application 
integration. In these areas, the state of the art is at the level of spaghetti code. SOA is, in fact, the first 
serious attempt at bringing some structure into that world. SOA can be done without web services and 
without business processes. 
Adequate representation, communication, and analysis of service-oriented architectures require 
specific modelling techniques. Many techniques and languages originally focussing on business 
processes are increasingly applied to SOA, too. The most prominent ones are BPMN, EPC (event-
process chains), YAWL, ADEPT, and versions of UML (activity) diagrams. Moreover, dedicated 
implementation oriented languages such as WS-BPEL are used for human communication about 
services. The most promising recent approach is the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN), 
supported by leading companies of the software industry. Languages such as BPMN support 
communication about (cross-organizational) business processes.  Each modelling language comes with 
a tool or a tool set, supporting graphical representation, translation to executable software, and – to a 
minor extent – correctness and consistency tests. However, those techniques and languages appear not 
as attractive and are not as widely used as they could and should be. Not only the software industry, 
but also textbooks describe SOA usually by means of plain English, informal graphics, pseudo code, 
and programs in concrete programming languages. But those means are too often ambiguous, and 
concrete programs tend to mix substantial aspects with coincidental ones.  
In the rest of this paper we suggest that SOAs can be constructed cheaper, quicker, better 
understandable, more reliable, simpler maintainable, etc, by means of models. This applies in 
particular to the following problems: 
Service Composition: In a common scenario, established business processes are to be composed, in 
order to jointly reach their respective business goals. This is usually intended to be achieved by means 
of particular software constructs, denoted as orchestrations and choreographies. These notions need to 
be disambiguated. Furthermore, it is debatable whether it is a better choice to model business 
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processes together with interacting facilities and to do – on a basic level of argument – without 
orchestrations and choreographies. 
Semantics of services: A lot of questions arise in analogy to programming languages, including the 
fundamental one:  What is the semantics of a service, specified in a given modelling language? This is 
particular challenging, as some components of languages may not be intended to be implemented and 
thus deserve no formal semantics. Nevertheless, a notion of equivalence is required also in this case. 
Expressive power of modelling languages: Again, this is a challenging problem, in particular due to 
the "always on" principle of services. In this context it is useful to identify the bare minimum of 
expressive power needed to specify services (and, consequently, the concepts common to all 
modelling languages). 
Substitutability of services: This is a hairy problem, because long running processes (e.g. insurance 
contracts) must be substitutable during execution. 
Brokering: The "SOA triangle" assumes a broker to match offerings of service providers with 
requirements of service requesters. This requires abstract information about processes and their 
capabilities from a user perspective: Which kind of information should the provider and the requestor 
disclose about their offered and requested services? This topic must be discussed on the level of 
models before it goes to implementation. 
Relation between abstract and implementable processes: This topic has been partly addressed by 
extensions such as "BPEL for People", but deserves more investigation on the model level. 
Reliability and Correctness: Properties of single and of composed services must be formulated and 
verified, to varying levels of rigour, on their models. 
Monitoring and conformance: The realization and analysis of SOA is important, but only one side of 
the coin. The analysis of services while they are running is at least as important. It is vital to 
continuously monitor services to see whether they behave as expected. Moreover, the conformance of 
the real-life enactment and the normative models should be measured to detect mismatches and 
anomalies.
Discovery and mining: Process and data mining techniques can be used to extract information from 
interacting services. Process discovery, protocol mining, network analysis, etc. can be used to extract 
models from recorded behaviour.  
Design Methodology: Methods and principles of Software Engineering must be adapted to SOA, on 
the level of models.
The above questions are both fundamental for SOA and far from being solved.  
In the rest of this paper I suggest very first elements of an abstract basis of services. A generic 
modelling technique is exemplified in Chapter 3. 
2. Some First Assumptions for a Formal Framework 
Communication of services is conceptually to be organized as a service composition. Composed 
services together behave with regard to their joint environment like one service. For example, a travel 
agent composed with a flight carrier and a hotel may jointly offer week-end trips. 
Each instance of communication between services may terminate. For example, a travel agent's 
communication with a client may terminate either with a contract, or with the understanding that the 
travel agent fails to meet the client's requirements. An example for irregular termination was a client's 
request never answered at all. 
In a more refined setting, one may replace the requirement for termination by some more sophisticated 
"beauty predicate", or by additional conditions. Summing up, in the set S of all services we assume a 
binary composition operator 
: S x S  S 
Furthermore we assume a "beauty" predicate, i.e. a subset p of S. 
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In most cases, p denotes weak termination. This already lays the ground for a canonical, rich theory of 
services, covering a wealth of important notions, questions and properties, as they are particular 
important in the framework of SOA. 
Two services R and S are partners iff their composition meets the "beauty" predicate, i.e. if 
RS is an element of p: 
As services are made to communicate, i.e. are to be composed, the semantics of a service S is the set 
sem(S)  =def  {R | R is a partner of S} 
of all partners of S. 
The fundamental notion of partners of a service S gives rise to a lot of questions: 
 Composability: Given another service R, is R a partner of S? 
 Controllability: Does S have partners at all? 
 Most liberal partner: Is there a canonical partner of S? 
 Operation guideline: How characterise all partners of S? 
 Adapter generation: Given another service R, construct a service T such that R is a partner of 
ST.
The above definition of the semantics of a service implies a canonical comparison of the 
comprehensiveness of the capabilities of services: The capabilities of a services R are at most as
comprehensive as those of S (written R<S) iff each partner of R is a partner of S. Hence, 
comprehension is a partial order on the set of all services, defined by 
R<S iff sem(R) is a subset of sem(S). 
A typical step towards a more comprehensive service was the above travel agent, additionally offering 
ship cruises. 
Consequently, two services are equivalent iff they comprehend each other, i.e. iff they have the same 
partners. This equivalence is in fact the canonical counterpart of functional equivalence in the classical 
setting: Two systems are equivalent whenever their environment can not distinguish them. 
3. A Modelling Technique for Services 
The above considerations provided a conceptual framework which is now to be substantiated by a 
concrete modelling technique for services. It seems obvious from the previous considerations that 
programming languages are no adequate candidates for this endeavour. 
Modelling techniques such as BPMN tend to a maximum of expressivity, for convenience to its users, 
resulting in a large number of concepts and graphical symbols. Here we follow the opposite direction, 
asking for the bare minimum of notions needed to model SOAs. The resulting generic technique 
highlights the characteristics of services and their composition. Furthermore, it is supported by 
nontrivial analysis techniques. The most widespread such techniques are based on Petri Nets. This is 
motivated by the observation that the communication style of services, i.e. asynchronous message 
passing, is perfectly met by the semantics of places of Petri Nets. Consequently, a service S can 
be modelled as a Petri Net with distinguished places to model the interface of S.
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Figures 1 (a) and (b) show tow typical examples of services. Their intuitive meaning is obvious: (a) 
describes the service of a vending machine which expects its partners first to drop a coin and then to 
press a button, selecting coffee or tea. Finally, the vending machine provides the drink. Figure 1 (b) 
shows a corresponding partner. Finally, (c) shows the composition of the vending machine with its 
partner. The composed system terminates with tokens in terminal places. 
Here we apply the usual conventions for graphical representations for Petri Nets with the interfaces 
places on the surface of an enclosing box. For the composition RS of two nets R and S we assume 
w.l.o.g. that R and S are disjoint except for interface places. The sets of places, transitions, arcs and 
the initial marking of RS are just the union of the corresponding sets of R and S. An out-place of R 
which is coincidently an in-place of S (and vice versa, an in-place of R which is coincidently an out-
place of S) turns into an inner place of RS. Figure 1 (c) shows the composition of the two nets as 
given in (a) and (b). 
Besides the partner shown in Fig. 1 (b) the vending machine has many more partners. Figure 2 (a) 
shows the tea-partner; (b) shows the coffee-or-tea-partner, and (c) shows that a partner may swap the 
order of dropping a coin and selecting a beverage.  
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There is no need for a service model to do with only one thread of control: Figure 3 shows a partner C 
with three threads of control. In fact, C is the most permissive partner of Fig. 1 (a): To derive any other 
partner form this one, extend the order in which actions occur in C, and fix one of the alternatives. 
The operating guideline OG(S) of a service S describes all possible ways to make use of S. In the 
above technical framework this means OG(S) describes all partners, i.e. the semantics sem(S). In fact, 
OG(S) can finitely be described for each service S. Essentially, this description is an inscribed version 
of the most permissive partner of S. 
It is interesting to observe that there exist services with no partners at all: Figure 4 shows a variant of 
the vending machine which internally selects either tea or coffee. A partner would have to be able to 
correctly "guess"" this selection. 
This kind of Petri Net models is expressive enough to define a feature complete semantics of the most 
important specification language for services, WS-BPEL [1],[2],[4],[6],[8],[9]. At the same time it is 
simple enough for a series of deep analysis techniques. For example, there are algorithmic solutions to 
all problems mentioned at the end of Chapter 3 [5]. 
4. Services with Ports 
A theory of services must allow for abstraction. To this end we suggest ports as sets of interface 
places. Technically, the ports of a net S define a partition of the interface places of S, i.e. each 
interface place belongs to exactly one port. Furthermore, each port is named, with different ports of a 
service S named differently. For reasons to become reasonable later, each port is either an in-port or an 
out-port. 
58
Figure 5 extends two nets of our running example by ports. Payment and choice are names of in-ports 
of the vending machine as well as out-ports of the coffee partner. Vice versa, supply is the name of an 
out-port of the vending machine, as well as of an in-port of the coffee partner. The composition RS
of two nets R and S with ports is again a net with ports. 
As an example, the composition of the "plain" vending machine and coffee partners in Fig. 3 (b) and 
(c) resulted in the net (c) with "tea" an in-place. This is counter-intuitive. In fact, the composition of 
the versions with ports, as in Fig. 5, results in the intuitively satisfying open net of Fig. 6. 
5. Many Partners 
A service (and hence a net) may serve more than one partner. As an example, the vending machine's 
partner in Fig. 3 can be dissolved into three partners, as in Fig. 7. 
59
They together serve the port equipped version of the vending machine in Fig. 5. Each of the three nets 
can be constructed without considering the other two. This is not possible for all open nets with ports. 
As an example, Fig. 8 (a). 
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Company profit
”Light up area” profit
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Service: Light up area
Player moves closer 
to other players 
[1:18 years]
By cheating the player 
can light up the 
area more effectively
[1:18 years]
By cheating the player 
does not use points to 
light up the area
[1:18 years]





The attacker cannot light 
up an area because he 
received too few points
[X:70 years]
”Light up area” profit
Eavesdropper
Hacker










player’s score is too 
low and incorrect. 
[X:35 years]
The player attack 
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Service: Put up an extra protective shield
The attacker cannot put 
up an extra protective 
shield because he 
received too few points
[Z:70 years]
By cheating the player can 
protect himself more effectively 
[1:12 years]
”Put up an extra 
protective shield” profit
Player moves 
away from other players
[X:18 years]
By cheating the player 




attack without lighting 

















The player can make 
an assesment on how he 
should protect himself when 
area is light up
[1:12 years]
The attacked 
player’s score is too 
low and incorrect. 
[X:35 years]
1.0
Another player lights 
up the area the player 
was previously in
[X:36 years]
Another player is 
not warned 
[Y:18 years]
The other player does 
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Player attack the target 




player’s score is too 
low and incorrect. 
[1:35 years]
0.2
By cheating the player uses an 
almost correct amount of points to 
strike and earns a lot of points
[1:12 years]
The player who 
cheats wins the game
[1:36 years]
By cheating the player’s 
strike is more effective
[X+Y:18 years]
The attacker cannot 
strike because he 





is not warned 
[X:18 years]
Player 
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Player moves closer 
to other players 
[1:18 years]
Player moves away 
from other players
[1:18 years]
The player attack 
without lighting up 
the area first
[1:18 years]
The player can make 
an assesment on how he 
should protect himself when 
area is light up
[1:12 years]
Another player lights 
up the area the player 
was previously in
[1:36 years]
Another player is 
not warned 
[1:18 years]
Player attack the target 




player’s score is too 









By cheating the player 
does not use points to 
light up the area
[1:18 years]
By cheating the player 
does not use points to 
protect himself 
[1:36 years]
The other player 
does not use points to 
protect himself
[1:18 years]
By cheating the player’s 
strike is more effective
[2:18 years]
By cheating the player 
can light up the area 
more effectively
[1:18 years]
By cheating the player 
uses an almost correct 
amount of points to strike 











The attacker cannot light up an area 
because he received too few points
[1:70 years]
The attacker cannot strike 
because he received too few points
[1:70 years]
The attacker cannot put up an 
extra protective shield because he 
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Service Contracts in a Secure Middleware  
for Embedded Peer-to-Peer Systems1 
F. Benigni, A. Brogi, S. Corfini, T. Fuentes 
Department of Computer Science 




Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are distributed computing systems where all network elements act 
both as service consumers and service providers. Most P2P communication mechanisms are not 
based on pre-existing infrastructures, but rather on dynamic ad-hoc networks among peers [1]. 
Embedded Peer-to-Peer (EP2P) systems [2] introduce new challenges in the development of 
software for distributed systems. An EP2P system is a P2P system where small, low-powered, low-
cost embedded devices cooperate in exchanging and processing information using wireless 
channels. EP2P systems can be employed in a number of different application areas, including 
mobile telephony, home systems, or environmental monitoring. EP2P systems present a high 
degree of heterogeneity (applications may run on different devices, from PDAs to sensor network 
nodes, with quite different network bandwidth and computing power) and autonomy (the devices 
enter and exit the system in an independent way, calling for frequent reorganisations of the 
system). 
 
One of the keys for the successful development of EP2P systems is the possibility of suitably 
abstracting from low level P2P issues (such as the continuously changing network topology, and 
the connections and disconnections of peers) by means of convenient middleware. The goal of the 
Secure Middleware for Embedded Peer-To-Peer Systems (SMEPP) European Project 
(www.smepp.org, [3]) is precisely to develop such a middleware, that will have to be secure, 
generic, and adaptable to different devices (from PDAs and smart phones to embedded sensor 
actuator systems) and to different domains (from critical systems to consumer entertainment).  
 
One of the objectives of SMEPP is to feature a high-level, service-oriented model to program the 
interaction among peers, thus hiding low-level details that concern the supporting infrastructure. 
SMEPP services are associated with service contracts - which provide standard descriptions of 
SMEPP services - and with service groundings - which provide details on how to interoperate with 
services (i.e., communication protocols, message formats, port numbers, etc.). Service contracts 
are the key ingredients of the SMEPP mechanisms for service publication and discovery. 
 
In this paper, after briefly introducing the main features of the SMEPP model, we describe the 
structure of service contracts that has been defined in the SMEPP project. 
 
 
2. The SMEPP model  
The design of the SMEPP service-oriented model has been driven by a thorough analysis of the 
middleware, security, and application requirements that were identified during the first year2 of the 
project [4,5,6]. 
                                                     
1
 Work partly supported by the SMEPP project (EU-FP6-IST0333563). 
2
 The SMEPP project is a 3 year project that started in September 2006. 
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The key features of the model are the notion of group of peers, the notion of service offered by 
peers (or by groups), and the concern for security. In short, the model defines a set of security-
aware primitives for peer management (e.g., to create peers), for group management (e.g., to 
create, join, or leave groups), for service management (e.g., to publish, unpublish, or discover 
services), and for message and event handling (viz., to send or receive messages, or subscribe, 
unsubscribe, raise, and receive events), to be implemented by one or more APIs3. Such primitives 
are the basic bricks for constructing the code of P2P entities4.  
 
2.1 SMEPP primitives  
Because of space limitations, we only list here (Figure 15) the set of SMEPP primitives available to 
software developers. A detailed description of the SMEPP primitives and of the SMEPP model can 
be found in [7,8]. We only outline here that service management primitives include a publish
primitive (to publish a service contract in a SMEPP group), a getServices primitive (to identify 
the published services that match a given contract template), and a getServiceContract
primitive (to retrieve an actual service contract). 
 
// Peer Management Primitives 
peerId newPeer(credentials)
peerId getPeerId(id?)








peerId[] getPeers(groupId?,credentials)   




          getServices(groupId?,peerId?,serviceContract?,maxResults?,credentials)
serviceContract getServiceContract(serviceId)
sessionId startSession(serviceId)










Figure 1. The SMEPP primitives. 
 
 
2.2 SMEPP modelling language 
The SMEPP model is equipped with a high-level language (SMoL — SMEPP Modelling Language) 
for specifying how to orchestrate SMEPP primitives into peer or service code. The availability of a 
                                                     
3 
The reference implementation (currently under development) is Java-based.
 
4 
 We shall use the term “entity” to refer to peers or services.
 
5
The question mark denotes optional parameters, square brackets represent arrays, and angle brackets 
composite data structures.
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high-level specification language notably simplifies the time-consuming and error-prone task of 
specifying the interactions of a complex P2P system. Most importantly, the definition of formal 
semantics for such a language [8,9] enables the simulation and the analysis of the behaviour of 
peers and services, thus featuring the possibility of developing not only secure, but also a priori 
verified SMEPP specifications. Furthemore, the availability of automatic translators (e.g., the 
prototype SMoL2Java compiler) greatly simplifies the generation of executable code, which can be 
further completed to express data-related details of peer/service behaviour. 
 
SMoL defines the behaviour of the SMEPP entities as compositions of basic commands into 
structured ones. SMoL is inspired by version 2.0 of BPEL [10], which recently became the OASIS 
standard for describing Web service compositions. A BPEL process describes the behaviour of a 
Web service that orchestrates one or more WSDL [11] services, and in turn, it exposes a WSDL 
interface to its clients. Similarly to BPEL, SMoL aims to describe both abstract and executable 
entity behaviour. The former is an abstract presentation of the service concrete behaviour (e.g., the 
abstract behaviour of a Java service), that can be exposed to potential clients. The latter serves to 
describe the actual executable behaviour, which can be executed in dedicated SMoL engines. 
Since the BPEL semantics [12] is quite complex (e.g., due to synchronisation links and dead-path 
elimination), the analysis of (interactions of) BPEL processes is both troublesome and very time 
consuming. Furthermore, the SMEPP requirements do not request several BPEL constructs 
(concepts). Therefore, SMoL has been designed from BPEL basically by removing the following 
BPEL concepts: compensations, synchronisation links (and hence dead-path-elimination), the 
forEach construct, serializable scopes, partner links, message properties, and correlation sets. 
 
Because of space limitations, we only list here (Figures 2 and 3) the basic and structured 




void wait(for?, until?, repeatEvery?) 




Figure 2. SMoL basic commands. 
COM ::= BasicCommand | 
    Sequence COM+ EndSequence | 
    Flow COM+ EndFlow | 
    While boolCond COM EndWhile | 
    RepeatUntil boolCond COM EndRepeatUntil | 
    If boolCond COM Else COM EndIf | 
    Assign [Copy FROM TO EndCopy]+ EndAssign | 
    Pick [pickGuard COM]+ EndPick | 
    InformationHandler COM [infoGuard COM]+ EndInformationHandler | 
    FaultHandler COM [catchGuard COM]+ EndFaultHandler 
boolCond ::= logicalExpression 
FROM ::= variable | expression | literal | opaque 
TO ::= variable 
pickGuard ::= guard | wait(for?,until?) 
infoGuard ::= guard | wait(for?,until?,repeatEvery?) 
guard ::= receiveMessage(operationName) | 
          receiveResponse(id,operationName) | 
          receiveEvent(groupId?,eventName)
catchGuard ::= catch(faultName) | catchAll() 
Figure 3. SMoL structured commands. 
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3. SMEPP service contracts 
SMEPP services have contracts, groundings and implementations. The contract provides 
descriptive information on the service, while the implementation is the executable service (e.g., a 
C++ service) exposed to the middleware through a grounding.  
 
A service contract describes “what the service does” (viz., the service signature), “how it does it” 
(viz., the service behaviour), and it may include other extra-functional service properties (e.g., 
QoS). The signature provides an abstract description of the operations offered by the service to its 
clients, and of the events raised by the service. The signature is necessary for the service 
invocation. The behaviour is described by means of a SMoL specification, that is, an orchestration 
of SMEPP primitives. The description of the behaviour is optional6 and it serves, on the one hand, 
to match service contracts, and on the other hand, to analyse (e.g., to simulate) the functioning of 
entities, or their interactions with other entities.  
 
The core of the SMEPP service-oriented model borrows concepts from state-of-the-art Web service 
technologies. On the one hand, we model service contracts using XML schemas and, in particular, 
we model service signatures similarly to WSDL [11] interfaces, and ontology information using the 
Ontology Web Language (OWL [13]). On the other hand, we model service behaviour similarly to 
BPEL [10] processes.  
Generally speaking, we partition services into two classes: state-less and state-full services. On the 
one hand, state-less services do not keep track of their interactions with clients. Clients can invoke 
the operations of such services one or more times and in any order. For example, a temperature 
monitoring service can be implemented as a simple state-less service that only offers one 
operation that returns the environment temperature. Entities can then invoke this operation every 
time they wish to get a reading of the temperature.  On the other hand, state-full services keep 
track of their interactions with clients. We divide state-full services into session-less and session-
full services. Intuitively speaking, session-less (state-full) services are services that feature a single 
virtual communication channel, which is shared by all clients, and which is available since the 
service is published until the service is unpublished. Session-less services suitably model shared 
resources such as a shared whiteboard where every client can sketch at anytime. Session-full 
services instead maintain one channel, and one interaction state, per client. For instance, a remote 
calculator simultaneously serving several clients can be provided as a session-full service. The 
following Figure summarizes how the three types of services can be classified according to the 
concepts of interaction state and session management. 
 
 Without interaction state With interaction state 
Managed without sessions state-less session-less 
Managed with sessions  session-full 
Figure 4. SMEPP service types. 
 
As we will see next, while contracts always declare the type of behaviour of a service (state-less, 
session-less or session-full), the specification of the behaviour via a SMoL specification is optional 
in contracts. 
 
                                                     
6
 We use the term behaviour-less to refer to services that do not expose behaviour information in their 
contracts. Dually, we use the term behaviour-full to refer to services that expose behaviour information in 
their contracts. 
72
3.1 Structure of SMEPP service contracts 
According to the SMEPP requirements, SMEPP service contracts must be: 
 Multilanguage and multiplatform: The same contract must be consumed by all the SMEPP 
implementations (e.g., Java, NesC) and also by all the considered devices (e.g., laptops, PDAs, 
smart phones). 
 Simple and light: Contracts must be easily downloaded and processed by small devices in 
[E]P2P environments. 
 Extensible and easy to manage: The contract definition must be easily extensible but at the 
same time it should remain compatible with the previous versions. The contract will be used to 
discover services, hence it should be easy to manage.  
 
According to the aforementioned requirements, a SMEPP service contract is expressed using XML 
and its structure is validated by an XML schema file [7]. The structure of a SMEPP contract 
contains the following elements: 
 Profile. The profile of the service, which is mandatory, defines basic information on the service, 
such as the service name and the service category. 
 Signature. The signature of the service is mandatory and it includes: 
o Operations description. For each operation provided by the service: 
 operation name, 
 operation type (one-way, request-response), 
 input parameters description (name, type, possibly other extra information), 
 output parameters description (name, type, possibly other extra information), 
 list of exceptions (faults) possibly raised by the operation.  
o Type declarations. 
o Optional ontological annotations. 
o Possibly other additional information (e.g., other service documentation). 
Signature information is expressed with a reduced version of WSDL 2.0 [11]. SMEPP supports 
two types of operations: one-way (corresponding to the wsdl:in-only message exchange pattern) 
and request-response (corresponding to the wsdl:in-out message exchange pattern). 
 Behaviour. The service behaviour specifies the interaction protocol that the service follows, in 
order for the client to correctly interact with it. The service behavior must at least specify the 
service type (state-less, session-less, session-full),  and it can set an upper bound to the 
number of running sessions (in the case of a session-full service). The service behaviour 
optionally includes a (possibly partial) specification of the workflow representing the service 
execution, presented using SMoL. The SMoL service behavior specification is included in the 
contract by means of an XML schema plugged-in into the basic Contract.xsd.  
 Properties. Optionally the service contract can include additional information helping to 
categorize the service according to different criteria (e.g., geographical, business type etc.). 
Supplementing the service contract with these values provides useful metadata and context that 
can be exploited to discover and consume the services. The categorization of a service is 
expressed with a list of properties, each specifying category, name, and value of the property. 
The category can be a reference to a taxonomy defined in a separate file. 
 QoS. Optionally the contract can include information describing the Quality of Service (QoS) 
offered by the service. The QoS information must be expressed in a machine understandable 
format, so that the middleware can include QoS monitoring tools to verify how the service is 
fulfilling the expected QoS. Contract express QoS with a fixed XML schema that defines some 
QoS parameters and the relations among them, and it also allows the use of optional ontological 
annotations to improve the semantic information related to the QoS. For each QoSParameter 
the following information can be processed: 
 Name: The name of the QoSParameter 
 Domain: The domain or classification of the information contained in by the QoSParameter 
(e.g., Runtime-related, Transaction-Support, Security-Level, Cost-related, etc.). 
 Nature: The way in which the value is computed (viz., Dynamically, Statically). 
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 QoSImpact: Describes the way in which a variation or unfulfillment of the QoSParameter 
would affect the performance and QoS of the service. In general it describes the influence 
(impact) that the QoSParameter produces over the whole service. 
 QoSMetric: Describes the unit of measure and the way in which the QoSParameter can be 
measured. For example, the value ‘50’ can be defined as a numeric type (e.g., xs:int), but  
the numeric value ‘50’ may represent diverse concepts (percent, megabits per second, 
etc) and then QoSMetric can add some semantic meaning to ‘50’ by means of the 
definition of its associated metric. 
 RelationShip: Describes how this QoSParameter can affect other QoSParameters. 
 Aggregations: Describes some compositional rules applied to the QoSParameter. Used to 
describe compound QoSparameter. 
 Optional ontological annotations.  
3.2 A simple example  
The following is a very simple example illustrating the (friendly) syntax of the contract for a 













<callerId> = receiveMessage("getTemp") 
t = opaque // measure ambient temperature 




[Business::Functionality] = “Environmental Sensor” 
QoS:
- [Transaction_Support::integrity] = 100‘%’
- [Runtime_Related::latency] = 5‘sec’
latency produces an inverselyProportional impact over performance
- [Runtime_Related::throughput]  = 1000‘request per hour’
throughput produces a proportional impact over performance
- [Runtime_Related::performance]  = 100‘%’ 
performace is a compound QoSParameter composed by latency and throughput
End_Contract
Figure 5. Friendly representation of a SMEPP service contract. 
 
Note that – for exemplification purposes – the above contract includes a SMoL specification of the 
service behaviour, even if the considered service is state-less. Note also that, for readability, we 
employed a  friendly syntax for properties. For instance [Geografy::Location]=“Italy” should 
be read as “the property named Location corresponding to the category Geography has the string 
value Italy”. Similarly, [Runtime_Related::latency]=5‘sec’ should be read as “the 
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QoSParameter named latency corresponding to the QoSDomain Runtime_Related has the 
numeric value 5 and is measured in seconds (‘sec’).” 
 
4. Service grounding 
The service grounding must include some metadata needed to correctly interoperate with the 
service. To let the SMEPP middleware use services which can be implemented in different ways 
using different platforms and architectures, we need to define a structure of grounding satisfying all 
the possible services architectures and implementations (e.g., component model, web services, 
remote objects, RPC, etc.). This section describes the service grounding specification for third 
party services, whilst SMEPP services will be accessed by the middleware by means of a standard 
interface which is part of the SMEPP API implementation. 
 
The SMEPP middleware controls the instantiation and invocation of services into the [E]P2P 
environment, while SMEPP clients can interact with SMEPP services only through primitives (e.g., 
getServices, invoke, etc.) which do not allow the reception of any information about grounding 
(e.g., address, port number, etc). SMEPP grounding information is only managed in the provider’s 
middleware, thus it cannot be used by clients to directly connect to SMEPP services. The XML 
schema of service groundings for third party services, sketched in Figure 6, is defined in the file 
Grounding.xsd. 
Figure 6. Representation of the Grounding.xsd schema. 
The binding element of a SMEPP grounding is equivalent to the binding element of a WSDL 
document.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
The way in which SMEPP contracts have been defined obviously bring similarities with other 
definitions of contracts that have been proposed in other research projects. For instance, signature 
information in SMEPP contracts is expressed with (a simplification of) WSDL 2.0 [11], while service 
behaviour is specified with SMoL, which is a simplification of BPEL [10]. While OWL-S [14] process 
models can be used to describe service behaviour, SMEPP does not employ OWL-S to represent 
service behaviour since OWL-S does not allow one to naturally model exception and event 
handling (which are instead a central part of SMoL and SMEPP, especially important for 
verification and analysis purposes). SMEPP instead shares with OWL-S the use of OWL ontologies 
to annotate concepts in contracts. SMEPP definition of QoS is instead borrowed from the Amigo 
project (“Ambient intelligence for the networked home environment”) [15]. 
 
The SMEPP service discovery mechanism relies on service contracts. Queries (issued via the 
getServices primitive) employ partial contract specifications – also named contract templates –to 
restrict the set of candidate contracts to be retrieved. The current prototype implementation of the 
service discovery component of the SMEPP middleware supports syntactic queries – taking into 
account ontological annotations, if any - that can involve all parts of contracts but SMoL 
behavioural descriptions.  
 
Immediate future activities are going to be devoted to experiment the resource requirements for the 
different types of devices participating in SMEPP applications, with the purpose of devising 
different types of matching for the different middleware configurations. Future work will also have to 
be devoted to develop tools for analysing the compatibility of behavioural descriptions, and to 
identify a suitable, less expressive language (e.g, behavioural types or even FSMs) to represent 
service protocols, in order to make their inclusion in the matching feasible in the context of SMEPP. 
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Abstract
We have designed and developed a behavioral interface speci cation lan-
guage Moxa. that provides a modularization mechanism for contracts based
on assertions. The mechanism, called assertion aspect, can capture the cross-
cutting properties among assertions. In this paper, we brieﬂy explain the
notion of assertion aspects and the design of Moxa. By comparing the spec-
i cation to its JML counterpart, we show that the use of assertion aspects
clari es the large, complex speci cation and greatly simpli es each assertion
in the speci cation.
1 Introduction
Design by Contract (DbC) is a software development method that utilizes assertions
in a principled manner. In DbC, the “contract” between a class and its clients is a
set of conditions (pre-/postconditions of the methods and a class invariant) typically
represented as assertions embedded in the source code. The contract provides the
detailed interface speci cation of the class.
DbC is especially bene cial for developing reliable software systems. The au-
thors have experience in applying DbC to the actual development of a working
application in which reliability is the prime factor to be considered. The appli-
cation — AnZenMail client — is a secure and reliable e-mail client implemented
in Java. It is a part of the AnZenMail system [8], an experimental testbed for
cutting-edge security enhancement technologies. The AnZenMail system has been
developed by a group of researchers involved in the research project “Research on
Implementation Schemes for Secure Software” supported by Japanese Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
The primary purpose of applying DbC was to ensure the code quality of the
AnZenMail client. To ensure the code quality of the AnZenMail client, we rst
wrote a formal speci cation of its important component, called the Maildir Provider,
that should handle received e-mails and mail folders in a reliable way. We used




assertions. With this speci cation, we checked the component thoroughly using
the JML tools and then we could nd bugs in the code (including Sun’s JavaMail
components) and the assertions. This process, which was actually performed in-
crementally and repeatedly, enabled us to gradually obtain solid code and the rm
speci cation of the component. The nal speci cation consists of approximately
3,500 lines of assertions.
While we were carrying out the above process, we often observed the following
problem: changes made to an assertion in a class caused the propagation of changes
in the assertions within other classes. In principle, DbC assertions in a class are
independent from ones in other classes. But in real life, while we were working
with some large, seemingly unrelated classes, we often encountered the above phe-
nomenon. This can be a serious obstacle for developing, maintaining or extending
a large-scale software with DbC. We have observed that there are properties that
span over the assertions in several program modules (classes or methods). The
problem comes from the fact that the coverage of such properties does not t the
inherent structure made from the program modules. In other words, they crosscut
the modules.
To overcome the problem, we introduced a new modularization mechanism for
assertions that aims to separate the crosscutting properties. The mechanism is
based on assertion aspect, a new notion in aspect-oriented technology. So far, we
have designed a new behavioral interface speci cation language Moxa, an extension
of JML, that provides the mechanism[10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce
the notion of assertion aspect and our behavioral speci cation language Moxa.
Then, in Section 3, we compare Moxa to JML by using the same example. Section 4
mentions the related work. Section 5 o ers a discussion of the results.
2 Assertion Aspects in Moxa
2.1 Crosscutting Properties
As a part of the AnZenMail[8] client (mentioned in the previous section), we de-
veloped the Maildir Folder Service Provider (Maildir Provider for short), a Java-
Mail [9] component. It speci es the structure for directories of incoming e-mail
messages and can provide reliable hierarchical mailboxes by using sophisticated
algorithms for handling message les.
We used the Java Modeling Language (JML) [6] to describe the speci cation of
the Maildir Provider. In the speci cation we wrote, however, assertion expressions
become complicated and bulky. The size of the nal Java code of the Maildir
Provider and its JML speci cation (without the code) are about 2,500 and 3,500
lines respectively. This makes it di cult to develop the code and the speci cation
incrementally with keeping the consistency of assertions and code.
The source of the problem is the mismatch of modularization structures between
the assertions and the Java code. In JML, we write assertions as annotations
associated to classes and methods. This forces that assertions are grouped into the
modules enforced by the language — in this case, classes and methods. But this is
not always appropriate for the modularization of assertions.
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5 Ta C1.m1(T1 x1, ...);





11 Tc C3.m3(T3 x3, ...);
12 Td C4.m4(T4 x4, ...);
13 }
Figure 1: An Assertion Aspect in Moxa
2.2 Aspects in AspectJ
Aspect-oriented Programing (AOP) [5] is a programming technique for modulariz-
ing concerns that cross-cut the modules in programs. Some kind of code fragments
related to concerns such as logging, synchronization, exception handling or perfor-
mance optimization, are mingled within functional modules. In other words, they
cross-cut the modules. AspectJ [4] is an extension of Java that provides a mech-
anism for modularizing such tangled code. The key notions of the mechanism are
pointcut and advice. A pointcut is a set of join points that are particular locations
on the control ow of the program. An advice is a pair of pointcut and a code
fragment executed at the location selected by the pointcut. An aspect consists of
a set of advice.
2.3 Assertion Aspects in Moxa
The notion of aspect in Moxa is di erent from the one in AspectJ. The di erence
is that an aspect in Moxa is applied to speci cations (logical expressions written
as annotations), while an aspect in AspectJ is applied to code. We call aspects in
Moxa assertion aspects to avoid confusion with aspects in AspectJ.
Figure 1 shows that how an assertion aspect is de ned. In this de nition, S is
the name of this assertion aspect, C1 · · · C4 are class names, m1 · · · m4 are method
names, x1 · · · x4 are identi ers (arguments) and Ta · · · Td, T1 · · · T4 are type
descriptors. Pre1 and Pre2 (Post1 and Post2) are pre-conditions (post-conditions)
respectively.
An assertion aspect is a collection of advice (as in AspectJ). Figure 1 has two
advice: lines 2–6 and lines 8–12. The advice is a pair of a pointcut and an assertion
condition. The pointcut is a set of join points that are locations on the control
ow of a program. The location on the control ow where we want to test the
pre- or post-condition of the constructors or the methods, pre- and post-condition
location respectively and we call them assertion locations. Because the assertion in
Moxa is based on DbC, a join point is normally identical to the assertion location.
A descriptions of pointcuts (e.g., lines 5–6) consists of a set of method signatures
and positional keywords requires (or ensures). The rst advice (lines 2–6) in
Figure 1 describes two pointcuts at once that show the pre-condition location of
method m1 and m2, and the post-condition location of these methods.
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void Folder.close(*) throws MessagingException;
...
}
Figure 2: An Assertion Aspect Specifying State Transition of Folders (abridged)
A join point in Moxa corresponds to a location in the ordinary assertion declara-
tion technique where the assertion declaration is inserted. In the ordinary assertion
declaration technique, when we want to describe the same assertion in two or more
assertion locations, we have to describe assertions for each of those assertions loca-
tions. On the other hand, in Moxa, we can describe the condition of these assertions
only once by an advice whose pointcut selects these assertion locations.
2.4 Example
Figure 2 shows an assertion aspects that speci es the state transition of the class
Folder. This assertion aspect captures and modularizes a concern on the states of
folders. In this example, the logical expression in each pre-/post-condition consists
of the invocation of a method such as chkState_open. These methods are de ned
in actual classes (thus they are implementation dependent) and provide actual
state information. This makes the assertion aspect FolderState implementation
independent.
3 Evaluation
In this section, we compare Moxa to JML by using the same example. The target of
the speci cations is a part of the Maildir Folder Service Provider (Maildir Provider
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Table 1: Comparison of the Two Speci cations
JML Moxa
Service Store Service Store
# of Modules 1 1 3 5
# of Assertions 42 53 13 18
# of Lines 190 149 152 286
# of Lines / Module 190 149 51 57
for short) that is a part of the AnZenMail client mentioned in Section 1. The Maildir
Provider is a JavaMail [9] component that manages maildir style mailboxes on le
systems. We compared the speci cations of two classes Store and Service that are
de ned in the abstract layer of JavaMail . The items of comparison are the number
of modules (the number of classes in JML and the number of assertion aspects in
Moxa), the number of assertions (the number of pre- and post conditions in JML
and the number of advice in Moxa), and the number of lines (comments included).
The result of comparison is shown in Table 1, and its characteristics are described
below.
Number of Modules: In the case of JML, the number of modules for each
class is 1 because a modularization unit of JML must be matched to the class or
interfaces. In the case of Moxa, the number of modules are 3 and 5 for the class
Service and Store, respectively. This is because, each crosscutting condition of
assertion can be split into di erent assertion aspects.
Number of Assertions: In the case of JML, the number of assertions are 42 and
53 for the class Service and Store, respectively. In the case of Moxa, the number
of assertions are 13 and 18 for the class Service and Store, respectively, and each
number is smaller than the case of JML. This is because crosscutting conditions
over the assertions includes the same logical expressions, and they can be organized
into an advice in Moxa.
Number of Lines in Assertions: The number of lines in assertion descriptions
in JML are 190 and 149 for the class Service and Store respectively. On the other
hand, the total number of lines in assertion aspects of the Moxa speci cation are
152 and 286, for the class Service and Store respectively. Thus, we can see that
the average number of lines in an assertion aspect is much smaller than the average
number of lines in the JML speci cation. This comes from the fact that the same
logical expression of assertions for some join points are merged into one advice in
Moxa using pointcuts.
This result shows that using Moxa, the size of each module in a speci cation will
be reduced. We can also expect that this can clarify large and complex speci cations
by modularizing crosscutting properties that span over the program modules.
Locality of Changes: Table 2 shows the e ect of a simple change in the
code. Here, we replace the method boolean Service.isConnected() to boolean
Service.notConnected(). The table summarizes the e ect of this change on the
speci cations: the number of the modules (classes in JML and assertion aspects in
Moxa) we should x and the number of lines possibly to be a ected. In the Moxa
speci cation of the class Service (Store), we should only change 6 (4) modules.
Please note that we don’t need to examine the rest of the modules. The number
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Table 2: Number of Changes in the Speci cations
JML Moxa
Service Store Service Store
# of Changes 42 53 6 4
# of Lines in Changes 190 149 54 40
of assertions and the number of lines to be changed dramatically decreases, be-
cause of aspect-orientation. This result shows that Moxa provides higher locality
in speci cation.
4 Related Work
Injecting assertion validation code into application modules is a typical application
of AOP. There have already been several proposals on describing assertions using
AspectJ [7, 2, 3]. They point out the problems of embedding assertions in the pro-
gram code and propose ways to describe assertions separately from program code.
Especially, Lippert and Lopes [7] investigate that global properties on exception
detection and handling can be systematically represented using AspectJ.
Though writing validation code in AspectJ is one possible way to modularize
assertions, it is generally complex and error prone task. Moreover, this style of
assertion description is specialized to runtime validation. This means that using
assertions with other analysis/veri cation tools is di cult.
Since Moxa has a dedicated syntax, speci cations written in this language can
be used not only for runtime validation, but also with other tools. Currently we
are implementing Moxa processor as a translator to JML. Thus, it is possible to
use existing JML tools.
Contract4J [1] is another tool that supports DbC in Java. This tool provides
annotation based syntax for assertions and uses AspectJ for injecting validation
code.
Pipa [12] is an extension of JML whose target language is AspectJ. With this
language, we can describe assertions for the AspectJ constructs such as advice or
introduction. However, as in JML, assertions in Pipa are modularized within target
language (AspectJ) modules; i.e., classes or aspects. This means that Pipa does
not provide modularization of crosscutting properties. Extending Moxa to support
AOP languages is future work.
5 Discussion
5.1 Modularization of Assertions
The simple assertion description technique for object-oriented programming lan-
guage based on DbC such as JML has no mechanisms to control the mapping
between assertions and methods. So, specifying pre- and post-conditions are per-
mitted at most once a method, and they must be modularized by the unit of classes.
On the other hand, Moxa enables us to describe assertions independently of the
program structure considering assertion assignment location consists of a class, a
method, and pre- or post-condition locations as pointcut and assertion description
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as advice. In the technique, for example, the following style of assertion declarations
are permitted.
• Specifying assertions to a class from one or more assertion aspects.
• Specifying one or more assertions to an assertion location (logical expression
of these assertions are associated with logical product).
• Specifying assertions to one or more classes from one assertion aspect.
Using Moxa, we can split the behavior of object or object group into several
independent sides, and we can describe each side of behavior into separated as-
sertion aspects. This feature holds the scale and complexity of assertion aspects
small. Moreover, the viewpoint of each assertion aspect becomes narrowed to some
simple side. Hence, expressing and understanding the meaning of an assertion as-
pect becomes easy. Also, the maintainability and quality of assertion aspects and
corresponding programs are improved.
5.2 From Incremental Re nement to Model-Driven Devel-
opment
In Moxa, we can describe JML annotations along with assertion aspects, because
Moxa is an extension of JML. Therefore, Moxa enables us not only to modularize
assertions as assertion aspects independent of the programs structure, but also to
specify assertions as annotations embedded into the program. Such a feature is
favorable for the incremental development. Concretely, we can specify assertions
using in-place annotations for the program code at the early stage of development
or modi ed rapidly. Then, the code becoming stable and crosscutting properties
are unveiled, we can extract assertion aspects from annotations. This process can
be used for incremental re nement of existing code.
For example, suppose that we can extract an assertion aspect (say A1) from
a speci cation of an existing system. And suppose that A1 captures the state
transition of modules in the system (as in Figure 2) If A1 can be re ned to A2 that
represents a more reliable state model1, the we can re-apply A2 to the original code
and validate it to re ne the code itself. This process can gradually improves the
reliability of existing code.
Moreover, assertion aspects may represent other models. A sort of model-
driven development (as in [11]) might be possible by using appropriate tools that
generate a code skeleton from an assertion aspect. We have been extending Moxa to
include the support of protocol-oriented aspect description. The extension provides
convenient way to describe, test and verify speci cations that are described based
on method invocation sequence.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented the notion of assertion aspects and a new behavioral interface
speci cation language Moxa that provides a modularization mechanism for asser-
tions. The mechanism enables us to separate crosscutting properties spanning over
multiple assertions. It can clarify a large, complex speci cation and also can greatly
1
Here, the term model denotes the notion in MDD.
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simplify the assertions in the speci cation by eliminating common logical subex-
pressions. Assertion aspect broadens the scope of AOP by providing the separation
of speci cation concerns, instead of code concerns.
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Abstract
In recent years, dynamic component-based systems such as OSGi and
its derivatives have become very successful. This has created new chal-
lenges for verification. Assemblies are created and modified dynamically
at runtime, but many existing techniques such as unit testing are designed
for buildtime verification. Runtime verification is usually restricted to
type checks. We propose a simple component contract language that is
powerful enough to represent different types of complex contracts between
collaborating components, including contracts with respect to component
semantics and quality of service attributes, and contracts that refer to
resources other than programing language artefacts. These contracts can
then be used for runtime verification of assemblies. Contracts are based on
a pluggable contract vocabulary. We present a proof of concept implemen-
tation of the contract language proposed for the OSGi/Eclipse component
model.
1 Introduction
Component-based systems have become very popular in the last decade. While
initially used mostly in desktop application, component-based software engi-
neering is now used in many different areas including server-side and ubiquitous
computing. This has created a number of new challenges for component models
with respect to component lifecycle and resource management. Traditionally,
component models focus on one particular aspect to describe the relationship
between collaborating components - interface compatibility. This relationship
is defined by a contract that is usually expressed by means of programming lan-
guage artefacts like Java interfaces, or by using a dedicated interface definition
language (IDL). However, modern component models have to address use cases
where other types of contracts are involved. For instance, server applications of-
ten require a high level of reliability, and applications running on mobile devices
have special requirements with respect to the (hardware) resources components
can use. If components are dynamically discovered, it might not be enough to
know that these components provide the right interface, they must also have
the expected behaviour. Beugnards at al. [BJPW99] have investigated types of
component contracts and have classified contracts into four layers:
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1. Basic syntactic contracts expressing interface compatibility.
2. Behavioural contracts specifying component semantics.
3. Synchronisation contracts describing dependencies between components.
4. Quality of service contracts describing requirements with respect to re-
sponse times, quality of results etc.
Beugnards at al. have also discussed several technologies that could be used
to express contracts for the various layers. This includes the use of IDLs for
layer 1 and design by contract [Mey92] for layer 2. Other types of contracts not
covered by this classification include aspects related to security, trust and licens-
ing. For instance, an organisation might want to prevent the use of components
with contagious licenses, or configurations where components with incompatible
licenses are linked together.
In some modern component frameworks even basic layer 1 contracts can
be rather complex. A good example is the successful component model used
by Eclipse [Ecl]. Based on OSGi [OSG] bundles, Eclipse plugins use exten-
sion points and extensions to define required and provided resources. Often,
these resources are Java types - plugins define extension points using Java
interfaces, and require other plugins providing extensions to these extension
points to supply classes implementing the respective interfaces. However, in
general these contracts are highly polymorphic. An example for this is the
org.eclipse.help.toc extension point. In order to extend it, applications
have to provide help resources and a table of content XML file instantiating a
given document type definition. Moreover, many extension points use complex
logical expressions. An example for this is org.eclipse.ui.actionSets. Here,
the value of the attribute class must be a name of a class that implements an
interface. Which interface this is depends on the value of another attribute
(style).
In this paper, we introduce Treaty, a component contract language designed
to address these issues. The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we
summarise the Treaty contract language, we use an Eclipse-based example ap-
plication for this purpose. This application contains polymorphic and disjunc-
tive contracts, and uses unit test cases for layer 2 and layer 4 contracts. We
then discuss contract instantiation and verification. In section 4 we show how
contract vocabularies can be organised in a modular manner. In section 5 we
explore the use of unit test cases in contracts in more detail. We then discuss the
architectural aspects of Treaty, focusing on the relationship between contracts
and the underlying component model. A discussion of related work and open
questions concludes our contribution.
The Treaty framework and the example used throughout this paper are both
accessible on Google code1, the code is licensed under the Apache open source
license.
1http://code.google.com/p/treaty/, the Eclipse update site URL is
http://treaty.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/treaty-eclipse-updatesite/site.xml. The Treaty
plugin requires JDK 1.6 or better.
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2 Formalising Contracts
Components collaborate in different ways. When designing component-based
systems in an object-oriented language, the most common way of collaboration
is that one component provides an abstract type, while another component pro-
vides (an instance of) an implementation class of this abstract type. The use
of abstract types decouples the collaborating components. As mentioned in the
introduction, modern component-based systems like Eclipse use also different
types of contracts. For instance, components have to supply XML documents in-
stantiating document type definitions (DTDs) or XML Schemas. In general, we
can consider the artefacts provided and consumed by components as resources
identified by uniform resource identifiers (URIs). These resources are typed,
examples for types are instantiable Java classes, Java interfaces, IDL interfaces,
XML instances, XML Schemas, XSL files, DTDs, property files, and CSV files.
Relationships associating resources are defined for certain resource types only,
for instance Java classes implement Java interfaces, XML documents instantiate
DTDs, or style sheet transformations applying to instances of a certain XML
Schema.
In [DHG07] it has been proposed to use the semantic web standards RDF[KC04],
OWL[MvH04] and SWRL[HPSB+04] to model component contracts in a platform-
independent manner. While this has some obvious advantages, including the ex-
istence of a formal semantics for SWRL, the resulting rules are too complex and
do not support a compact representation of contracts. Furthermore, these con-
tracts have restricted expressiveness. In particular, complex constraints using
exclusive disjunctions cannot be represented. For this reason, we have developed
a custom XML vocabulary that supports the compact definition of component
contracts. This vocabulary is part of Treaty, the contract framework we propose.
Contracts define the relationship between two parties: consumer and supplier.
Treaty as a framework abstracts from the concrete nature of these entities. For
the example used here we use the proof of concept implementation of Treaty
for the Eclipse component model. Here, the consumer and supplier roles are
mapped to extension points and extensions, respectively.
Figure 1 shows such a contract 2. The respective example is implemented
as a set of Eclipse plugins. In this contract, the relationship between a com-
ponent that prints dates (clock view) and a component that provides a date
formatting service (date to string) is defined. The contract is attached to the
Eclipse component that has the extension point as an XML file in the component
meta-data folder (META-INF). The name of this file is defined by the following
naming convention: the name of the extension point followed by the extension
‘‘.contract’’. This mechanism is non-invasive - contracts can be added to
plugins without modifying existing plugin resources. Treaty does not modify
the Eclipse plugin registry either - it is only queried through public interfaces
and if there are no contracts found for an extension point it is interpreted as
empty contract.
A Treaty contract has three parts:
1. In the consumer section (lines 3-19), the resources of the extension point
are defined. The resources defined are constants identified by name and
type. The types are defined in an (external) ontology and represented by
2The package names are abbreviated
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URIs. This information can be used by the component to load resources
if needed, for instance by using the component class loader.
2. In the supplier section (lines 20-27), the resources of the extension are
defined. This is where a component provides resources to be consumed by
a consumer. These resources are also typed. Resources are now variables,
the ref element is used to define a variable that can be used to query
for the resource once a concrete extension is known. This reflects the
support for dynamic component models that use late binding. Details of
this mechanism are discussed further below.
3. In the constraints part (lines 28-45), the relationships between resources of
both sides are specified. The schema supports the use of standard logical
connectives such as AND, OR and XOR to define complex conditions.
In addition to relationships, value properties and existence conditions are
supported as well.
In the example shown in figure 1, the clock component that has the extension
point provides the following resources (package names for classes omitted):
1. The interface DateFormatter (id ‘‘Interface’’) that describes the in-
terface of the date formatter service.
2. The dateformat.xsd (id ‘‘DateFormatDef’’) schema that describes the
interface of an alternative service by means of an XML schema. Instances
of this schema define date formatting string templates.
3. The class DateFormatterFunctionalTests (id ‘‘FunctionalTests’’) de-
fines some JUnit functional test cases. The test cases check whether the
strings produced by a date formatter contain at least the day, the month
(as number or using the English name of the month) and the last two
digits of the year. They define the minimal information content of strings
rendering dates.
4. The class DateFormatterPerformanceTests (id ‘‘QoSTests’’) defines
JUnit quality of service tests. It checks whether a date formatter needs
less than 10ms to render a date.
The extending component must provide one of two resources: a Java class or
an XML document. The contract conditions state that a valid extension must
either provide an XML instance that is valid with respect to the schema, or an
instantiable class that implements the interface and passes additional functional
and performance tests.
Conditions in contracts can be either atomic or complex. To build complex
conditions, the usual logical connectives with their standard semantics can be
used. Three types of atomic conditions are supported: relationships between
resources, resource properties, and conditions that a resource must exist. Rela-
tionships and properties are equivalent to object and data properties in RDF.
The mustExist constraint is weaker - this merely asserts that the respective
resource must exist and must be of the declared type.
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1 <?xml version=” 1 .0 ” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
2 <cont rac t>
3 <consumer>
4 <r e s ou r c e id=” I n t e r f a c e ”>
5 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / java#AbstractType</ type>
6 <name>c l o ck . DateFormatter</name>
7 </ r e sou r c e>
8 <r e s ou r c e id=”QoSTests”>
9 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / j un i t#TestCase</ type>
10 <name>c l o ck . DateFormatterPerformanceTests</name>
11 </ r e sou r c e>
12 <r e s ou r c e id=”Funct iona lTests ”>
13 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / j un i t#TestCase</ type>
14 <name>c l o ck . DateFormatterFunct ionalTests</name>
15 </ r e sou r c e>
16 <r e s ou r c e id=”DateFormatDef”>
17 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org /xml#XMLSchema</ type>
18 <name>/dateformat . xsd</name></ r e sou r c e>
19 </consumer>
20 <s upp l i e r>
21 <r e s ou r c e id=”Formatter ”>
22 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / java#In s t an t i a b l eC l a s s</ type>
23 <r e f>/ s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r /@class</ r e f></ r e sou r c e>
24 <r e s ou r c e id=”FormatString ”>
25 <type>ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org /xml#XMLInstance</ type>
26 <r e f>/ s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r /@formatdef</ r e f></ r e sou r c e>
27 </ s upp l i e r>
28 <c on s t r a i n t s>
29 <xor>
30 <and>
31 <r e l a t i o n s h i p
32 r e sou rc e1=”Formatter ” r e sourc e2=” I n t e r f a c e ”
33 type=” ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / java#implements ”/>
34 <r e l a t i o n s h i p
35 r e sou rc e1=”Formatter ” r e sourc e2=”Funct iona lTests ”
36 type=” ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / j un i t#v e r i f i e s ”/>
37 <r e l a t i o n s h i p
38 r e sou rc e1=”Formatter ” r e sourc e2=”QoSTests”
39 type=” ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org / j un i t#v e r i f i e s ”/>
40 </and>
41 <r e l a t i o n s h i p
42 r e sou rc e1=”FormatString ” r e sourc e2=”DateFormatDef”
43 type=” ht tp : //www. t r ea ty . org /xml#i n s t a n t i a t e s ”/>
44 </xor>
45 </ c on s t r a i n t s>
46 </ cont rac t>
Figure 1: XML Contract Example
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condition semantics
property comparison of a property of a resource with a literal using
a comparison operator
relationship establishes whether a relationship exists between resources
mustExist true if the referenced resource exists
Table 1: Basic contract condition types
3 Contract Lifecycle and Verification
The sample contract is still abstract since it references resources (the resources
of the supplier) that are not yet known at the time the contract is written. The
supplier is only known later at runtime when late binding occurs. Only then the
contract can be instantiated. Contract instantiation is the creation of a deep
copy of the contract, and the instantiation of all resource proxies in this copy.
A resource proxy is a resource that has a ref attribute but no name attribute.
The ref attribute is a reference to the components meta-data. The Treaty
framework contains an interface ResourceManager that is used to resolve those
proxies. The details of resolving are component-model specific. In the Eclipse-
based implementation of Treaty, the ref values are XPath expressions and the
ResourceManager uses them to query the plugin meta-data (plugin.xml). In
an implementation of Treaty for pure OSGi the attribute values could just be
simple strings representing keys of properties defined in the bundle manifests.
Once an instantiated contract exists, verification can be performed. This is
the checking of conditions according to their semantics. When complex con-
ditions are present, this is usually done using a top-down strategy. This is
a simple process: once all resources are instantiated, contracts are essentially
statements of classical propositional logic. The question is how the basic con-
ditions are checked. This requires the resources to be loaded. For instance, to
check properties of a resource of the type AbstractType, the respective class
must be loaded so that it can be analysed using the Java reflection framework.
This is done with a ResourceLoader. Again, on the framework level this is an
interface that must be implemented when adapting Treaty for a particular com-
ponent model. In case of Eclipse, the loader uses the OSGi bundle classloader
to load resources.
4 Contract Vocabularies
Contracts reference types and properties. Both can be formally defined in a for-
mal ontology language, but this alone does not define their semantics [Usc01].
For instance, the semantics of the (Java) implements predicate (figure 1, line
33) is the set of pairs of concrete Java classes C and Java interfaces I such
that C implements I. In other terms, the semantics can be defined by a func-
tion that takes two resources C and I and can compute a boolean indicating
whether (C, I) ∈ implements is the case or not. This particular function is
easy to provide: if C and I can be loaded and are available as instances of
java.lang.Class, the method isAssignableFrom can be used to check this
condition. In a similar manner, a validating XML parser can be used to check
the instantiates property associating XML instances and XML schemas.
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A possible solution to this problem is to define a fixed type system that
contains a set of commonly used resource types, and implements some classes
that represent the semantics of their properties and relationships. However,
there might be very project-specific types and relationships to be used in con-
tracts. Consider a scenario where a company has a product with a reporting
extension point. This offers customers the option to plug-in their own reporting
templates with customised layouts and data aggregation. The resource type to
be provided by these components could be VelocityTemplate[Vel]. Or even
better, a project-specific MyReportTemplate type that represents velocity tem-
plates that use only a fixed set of variables which the host component can bind.
Then the component itself would make contributions to the contract vocabulary
in order to enable verification. There is a clear business use case for this: it
safeguards the company against faulty third party plugins which would result
in customers blaming the company for the malfunctioning of their software.
Therefore, the vocabulary should be kept open and extensible. This can
be achieved by using the component model itself to build modular contract
vocabularies. Each vocabulary component must provide the following:
1. A list of defined types (URIs) contributed by the component.
2. A list of defined properties (URIs) contributed by the component.
3. A list of defined relationships (URIs) contributed by the component.
4. A method to load a resource given a reference and a resource type. For
instance, this method is used to load resources of the type Java class
defined by an attribute in plugin.xml as Java classes using the plugin’s
class loader.
5. A method that can be used to check the properties and relationships
contributed by the component.
In the Treaty implementation for Eclipse, this functionality is defined through
the extension point net.java.treaty.eclipse.vocabulary. To extend this
extension point, plugins must implement an interface that has the methods to
load resources and check conditions, and have to provide an OWL resource that
defines the vocabulary extensions. Treaty merges the ontology contributions
into a central merged ontology. This ontology contains all contributed types,
properties and relationships, plus annotation indicating which component con-
tributed the respective artefacts.
The reporting template example shows the benefits of using formal ontolo-
gies. For instance, assume that the reporting template type MyReportTemplate
subclasses VelocityTemplate, and that the contract requires only the existence
of a reporting template. Because of the semantics of rdfs:subClassOf the veri-
fier could than first check whether the resource is of the type VelocityTemplate
by using the Velocity parser. If this fails, the resource cannot be an instance of
MyReportTemplate either. That is, the formal semantics of OWL can be used
to optimise verification.
For this reason, in the proof of concept implementation all components mak-
ing vocabulary contributions have access to a central singleton Vocabulary that
maintains the virtual merged ontology. This allows them to use ontology rea-
soning when checking contributed properties and relationships. The ontology
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can be accessed as unparsed stream or as java object representing the parsed
ontology.
5 Unit Testing at Runtime
The example contract (figure 1) uses the verifies property to express min-
imum requirements with respect to functionality and performance for classes
implementing the DateFormatter interface. This relationship is based on JU-
nit, that is, the test resources are JUnit 4 test cases, and their semantics is
defined by means of a JUnit test runner. JUnit test cases are defined in the
same component that defines the date formatter interface. These tests check
whether date formatter implementations can convert dates in less than 10ms,
and whether the generated strings contain at least tokens representing date,
month and year.
Unit testing is particularly useful here as it stands in the tradition of design
by contract - describing the semantics of methods through a description of the
state changing effects of the methods expressed by pre- and post conditions. The
main weakness of unit testing when compared to other verification methods is
that verification is based on selected specimen objects. Tests are not sufficient
to prove or ensure correctness, they can only be used to approximate it. The
main advantage of unit tests is that they are widely acceptance by programmers.
Also, it is easy to assess the degree of approximation (coverage metrics), and
there are well-established development processes to improve test cases when it
is necessary to improve the approximation.
Unfortunately, JUnit has been built for design and build time verification.
As a consequence of this it is assumed that the classes to be tested are known
when the test cases are written and can be directly referenced by test cases. On
the other hand, our approach supports late binding at composition time, that
is, test cases can only reference abstract types and the actual objects have to be
injected if the respective classes become available at runtime. Therefore, JUnit
needs to be modified to fit into Treaty. More precisely, support for dependency
injection mechanism must be added to JUnit. This is achieved by designing
test cases that have constructors with parameters that can be used to inject
the tested objects before the test case life cycle starts, and a special test runner
that can instantiate test cases using this constructor. Such a test runner is part
of the Treaty component that makes the JUnit vocabulary contributions.
6 The Bigger Picture - Adding Contracts to Com-
ponent Models
Treaty is implemented in Java and provides support for contract definition and
verification for the Java-based Eclipse component model. However, Treaty is
largely independent of the underlying component model and could also be used
to describe contracts in other component models even if they are not Java-based.
Treaty itself can be seen as a combination of three separate subsystems:
1. The Contract Definition Language (CDL), a formal language used to de-
fine contracts in a platform-independent manner. In this paper we have
100
proposed to use XML (constraint by the treaty.xsd schema) for this pur-
pose.
2. The Contract Execution Environment (CEE), a system that reads con-
tracts defined in the CDL and can instantiate and verify the contracts
against components of a host component model. The CEE proposed here
is implemented in Java and consists of two parts - an abstract contract
framework and an implementation of the abstract concepts in the frame-
work for the OSGi/Eclipse component model.
3. The Contract Vocabulary (CV), an ontology that defines the types and
properties that are used in contracts.
The CEE must reference the CM to instantiate resource references using the
reflective features of the CM (such as access to meta-data). It also uses the
CM to load resources needed to verify constraints. Finally, the CEE provides
the semantics for the (data and object) properties used in the vocabulary. The
CEE has access to the merged ontology and can use it for ontology reasoning.
Our Eclipse-based implementation adds two more relationships: both the
CV and the CEE take advantage of the CM to define both the vocabulary and
the parts of the CEE providing the semantics for the vocabulary in a modular
fashion.
7 Discussion
We have presented Treaty, a component framework that supports the easy defi-
nition of complex and polymorphic contracts. Our main contribution is the con-
tract language, and the modular design of the contract vocabulary. We believe
that using such a language adds value to environments that use late binding,
such as ubiquitous or mobile computing applications where new components are
discovered and integrated at runtime. The types of requirements that need to
be expressed in environments like this are somehow unpredictable. We therefore
think that using any fixed contract language is not appropriate. Instead, what
is needed in an extensible contract language based on a platform-independent
description of resource types and their relationships. This allows components
to plugin vocabulary extensions that can then be used by verification tools.
Treaty is still rather simple, and simplicity was one of the major design goals
when designing Treaty. One reason for this is of course the fact that much of the
work is delegated to the vocabulary contributions. However, in many cases it is
rather easy to write these contributions, and the level of reuse for vocabulary
elements would be much higher than the level of reuse of the actual application
components. The main advantage is that such an open framework supports a
consistent representation of different contract types by using a common meta-
model (OWL). To the best of our knowledge, no existing (academic or industrial)
component models or architectural description language achieves this.
In the prototype we have presented, verification is used as a central service
that checks the integrity of the entire system. It might be more useful in many
circumstances to check only contracts between certain components, for instance
in response to lifecycle events such as component activation. An interesting issue
is whether contracts should be attached to components consuming resources (as
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we have done this), to components providing resources or should be detached
from either (“contracts as entities in the middle”, as proposed in [Szy00]. On the
framework level, Treaty does support contracts on both sides and in the middle,
and the aggregation of multiple contracts. The proof of concept implementation
based on Eclipse however only support contracts on the consumer side at the
moment.
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